PDF Summary:Jesus and John Wayne, by Kristin Kobes du Mez

Following the 2016 US presidential election, pundits argued that the 81% of evangelical Christians who voted for Donald Trump over Hillary Clinton viewed him as the lesser of two evils. But, according to historian Kristin Du Mez, this explanation is misguided. In Jesus and John Wayne (2020), she argues that evangelicals endorsed Trump because he was the paradigm of militant masculinity that became orthodox among evangelicals in the last century.

In this guide, we’ve organized Du Mez’s analysis into four historical eras of evangelical masculinity. We’ll discuss: how the first and second World Wars caused evangelicals to shift toward a militant view of masculinity; how the Vietnam War and the feminist movement entrenched this view of masculinity in the ’60s and ’70s; how the lack of a military opponent in the ’90s caused this view to soften; and, finally, how the impact of 9/11 and the Obama presidency created a sense of embattlement that led evangelicals to support Trump in 2020.

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The Pushback Against the Feminist Movement

In addition to the upheaval caused by the Vietnam War, Du Mez points out that further social unrest in the ’70s stemmed from the feminist movement, which attempted to undermine traditional gender norms that confined women to the domestic sphere. She argues that, as a reaction to this movement, two sets of influential evangelicals—Marabel Morgan and Phyllis Schlafly on one hand, and Bill Gothard and James Dobson on the other—pushed back against feminism by defending traditional gender norms in marriage and in the nuclear family.

Du Mez writes that, in the ’70s, Morgan and Schlafly published influential anti-feminist books that spurred anti-feminist activism from evangelicals. For her part, Morgan argued that women ought to submit to their husbands to achieve domestic happiness because that was God’s intention for marriage (a belief known as complementarian theology). Moreover, because women ought to submit, Morgan concluded that men were required to become leaders in the domestic sphere. In a similar vein, Schlafly opposed the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), a proposed amendment to the US Constitution that prohibited denial of equal rights on the basis of sex, arguing that the amendment falsely presupposed that women were oppressed and thus needed protection.

(Shortform note: Since the ’70s, influential evangelical women have arguably taken a more charitable approach toward feminism. For example, prominent evangelical author Beth Moore—though not a feminist per se—has publicly disavowed the gender roles of complementarian theology, instead opting for an egalitarian approach. In so doing, she’s aligned her views with those of feminists who agree that strict gender-based roles in marriage and work are inherently harmful.)

While Morgan and Schlafly focused largely on evangelical women, Gothard and Dobson instead geared their advice toward evangelical men, arguing that men should rule the family with an iron fist. Du Mez relates that Gothard hosted seminars with over 200,000 evangelical attendees during the 1970s, teaching that societal problems stemmed from noncompliance with authority—problems that could be solved in the domestic sphere through unflinching obedience to fathers in the home. Likewise, Dobson—who founded Focus on the Family, an evangelical organization that sought to promote traditional family structures of male breadwinners and female housewives—emphasized the father’s responsibility to discipline his children with corporal punishment (that is, spanking).

(Shortform note: Although evangelicals like Gothard and Dobson endorsed corporal punishment as a means to disciplining one’s children, a wealth of research has shown that corporal punishment has detrimental effects later on in children’s lives. For example, one meta-analysis of studies found that corporal punishment of children was associated with significantly higher antisocial behavior as an adult, including increased violence, aggression, and various mental health issues.)

Evangelical Masculinity During the 1980s and 1990s

While opposition to the feminist movement helped spur on evangelical political engagement in the 1970s, Du Mez maintains that evangelicals became especially involved politically throughout the ’80s and ’90s. In this section, we’ll first look at the 1980 presidential election between Ronald Reagan and Jimmy Carter, which Du Mez claims was pivotal to the formation of the religious right, then examine how the lack of a concrete military opponent in the 1990s temporarily caused evangelicals to embrace a gentler masculinity devoid of its previous aggression.

The Reagan vs. Carter Election

Du Mez contends that a watershed moment for evangelical identity in the US occurred in the 1980 presidential election, which pitted Republican Ronald Reagan against incumbent Democrat Jimmy Carter. She argues that Reagan’s victory over Carter cemented the marriage between evangelicals and the political right: Even though Carter personally identified as an evangelical Christian—whereas Reagan was an infrequent churchgoer at best— evangelical voters embraced Reagan’s socially conservative policies and ruggedly masculine image.

Du Mez explains that Reagan intentionally built social capital with evangelical voters. For instance, while Reagan had previously supported the ERA as governor of California, he walked back his support while campaigning for president. Similarly, he began embracing evangelical policy points, such as supporting prayer in public schools and prohibiting abortion.

(Shortform note: Hot-button issues among evangelical voters are regularly in flux. For example, experts point out that evangelicals at the time didn’t oppose Roe v. Wade, the 1973 Supreme Court case that affirmed a woman’s right to an abortion in the first two trimesters—they saw abortion as an issue for Roman Catholics alone. Evangelicals, by contrast, only began mobilizing around pro-life causes in the late ’70s, following movements by evangelical leaders like Jerry Falwell Sr.)

However, Du Mez suggests that what ultimately sealed the deal for Reagan with evangelical voters was his perceived masculinity. Whereas Jimmy Carter was often deemed a “wimp” by critics, Reagan seemed reminiscent of a cowboy, even owning his own ranch in California. Moreover, Du Mez writes that Reagan reinforced this masculine appearance by becoming the “tough on crime” candidate who wasn’t afraid to ruthlessly punish criminals, even using violence when needed.

(Shortform note: The portrayal of Carter as a wimp stemmed from an accidental headline for a Boston Globe editorial piece following Carter’s 1980 speech on the energy crisis. While the headline was supposed to read “All Must Share the Burden,” author Kirk Scharfenberg’s facetious headline “Mush from the Wimp” ran instead in 161,000 copies before the mistake was caught.)

Consequently, Du Mez says, when the 1980 election came to pass, Reagan won the white evangelical vote in a landslide: 67% of white evangelicals voted for Reagan, even though 50% had voted for Carter in the previous election. Du Mez relates that since that 1976 election, no Democrat has even come close to winning the majority of the evangelical vote. (Shortform note: In fact, white evangelical voters have become even more likely to vote Republican in recent decades. One study shows that 76% of evangelicals identified as Republicans in 2016—up from 61% in 1992.)

The Formation of the Religious Right

Although Reagan’s election cemented the marriage between evangelicals and the right, Du Mez clarifies that two key parties laid the foundation for this religious right during the 1980s: The LaHaye family and Jerry Falwell Sr.

She notes that the LaHaye family includes Tim and Beverly LaHaye, each of whom played a role in strengthening the religious right. For his part, Tim LaHaye was a pastor whose books in the early 1980s stoked a sense of embattlement on behalf of evangelicals. He argued that progressives were undermining key aspects of evangelical life, such as education and the family, meaning evangelicals needed to align themselves with the right. Beverly LaHaye founded Concerned Women for America (CWA), an influential evangelical organization that targeted the progressive feminist agenda throughout the 1980s.

Similar to the LaHayes, Falwell Sr. was essential to bringing the religious right into the political mainstream. As Du Mez relates, he created the Moral Majority in 1979, an organization that sought to mobilize the religious right in elections throughout the 1980s. In particular, Falwell Sr. promoted a militaristic approach and advocated that America maintain a dominant military to fend off domestic and international threats, largely from Marxists who, according to Falwell, wished to undermine the evangelical family unit.

The Formation of the Religious Left

Although the religious right’s influence grew significantly during the ’80s, some experts contend that the religious left—a group of progressive politicians and activists whose religious faith is central to their image—is exerting increased influence in contemporary American politics. Broadly speaking, the religious left is centered around the social gospel, an attempt to apply Jesus’s teachings to remedy societal injustices.

Historically, some credit the religious left with the abolitionist movement in the US preceding the Civil War. This movement, researchers relate, was composed largely of churchgoers who believed slavery was contrary to humanity’s God-given rights. In the 21st century, the religious left has mobilized around issues such as racial equality, poverty mitigation, and the treatment of immigrants. For example, Secretary of Transportation Pete Buttigieg—a progressive politician and Episcopalian Christian—strongly critiqued Donald Trump’s immigration policies on the grounds that God wouldn’t condone placing children in cages and separating families at the border.

The Evangelical Shift Toward “Soft Patriarchy”

Du Mez points out that despite Falwell Sr.’s emphasis on militant masculinity, the US’s lack of a concrete military opponent throughout the 1990s caused this conception of masculinity to atrophy. Instead, evangelicals promoted a less virulent but nonetheless patriarchal view of masculinity according to which men were divinely ordained to lead in the home as servant-hearted leaders—people who lead first and foremost through serving.

According to Du Mez, this shift originated in evangelical theologians John Piper and Wayne Grudem’s 1991 book, Recovering Biblical Manhood and Womanhood. Piper and Grudem defended complementarianism, the view that God considered men and women to be moral equals but assigned them different roles. In particular, they contend that leadership in the house and the church was reserved for men. However, they also argued that men should lead with humility and love, unlike the militant, domineering leadership that Falwell Sr. preferred.

(Shortform note: Even within complementarian circles, evangelicals often disagree about the extent to which leadership in the church and home is reserved for men. For example, some complementarians argue that, although women shouldn’t be senior pastors in the church, they should nonetheless occupy other teaching positions, both at home and in the church. In defense of this view, they point to biblical passages such as Acts 18:26, which praises Priscilla (a woman) for teaching Apollos (a man) inside a synagogue.)

While abstract, Piper and Grudem’s ideas had concrete consequences via the Promise Keepers, an evangelical organization in the late 1990s. Du Mez writes that Promise Keepers promoted complementarian ideas of “soft patriarchy” by exhorting evangelical men to become gentle leaders. Promise Keepers members often vowed to become better husbands and fathers by forsaking sinful activities like drinking and adultery and being present in their children’s lives. According to Du Mez, Promise Keepers undermined the militaristic view of masculinity that evangelicals had previously espoused, while retaining its patriarchal bent.

(Shortform note: Members of the Promise Keepers organization commit to a set of seven key promises: to honor Jesus Christ; to pursue close friendships with other Christian men; to remain sexually and morally pure; to build strong marriages and families grounded in love; to serve others; to be unified with other Christians; and to influence the world by spreading the message of Jesus’s love.)

Evangelical Masculinity During the 21st Century

Although organizations like Promise Keepers seemed to signify a shift toward a less militant evangelical conception of masculinity, Du Mez suggests that this shift was short-lived in the 21st century. In this section, we’ll discuss Du Mez’s claim that 9/11 caused an immediate return to the militaristic masculinity of decades past, as well as her contention that this view of masculinity culminated in the 2016 election of Donald Trump.

The Immediate Impact of 9/11

Du Mez contends that the al-Qaeda attacks of 9/11 caused evangelicals to return to an aggressive, militant masculinity to fend off perceived threats from Islamic terrorists. To show as much, she examines evangelical authors’ writings about masculinity and how to raise masculine boys in the wake of 9/11.

As Du Mez relates, evangelical author John Eldredge argued in 2001 that instead of being gentle leaders, evangelical men ought to emulate God—whom he took to be the ultimate warrior, not a meek noncombatant. According to Eldredge, violence was constitutive of masculinity, a message that resonated with evangelicals in the war against terror following 9/11.

(Shortform note: In the decades since 9/11, some evangelicals have attempted to push back against the conception of God as an ultimate warrior. For example, in Dane Ortlund’s 2020 book, Gentle and Lowly, he portrays Jesus’s core character as “gentle and lowly at heart,” thus emphasizing the meekness that Eldredge disavows. According to Ortlund, Jesus (and therefore God) is closer to a tender, loving father than a violent warrior.)

Du Mez also highlights two other authors who in 2001 provided advice tailored to evangelical fathers seeking to raise Eldredge’s future warriors. For example, Focus on the Family founder James Dobson advised evangelical fathers to foster their sons’ natural aggression, which he considered a fundamental benefit of masculinity. Douglas Wilson went a step further, arguing that men were entitled to the God-given right of dominion—that is, the right to power in certain domains, such as in the home and the church. Consequently, he reasoned that parents should teach their boys to embrace their internal drive to conquer and rule, which included teaching them how to physically subdue their adversaries in a fight, whether with fists or with guns.

(Shortform note: Although Du Mez focuses heavily on Wilson’s belief that boys should learn how to conquer through fighting, other reviewers of Wilson’s work on child-rearing note that it encompasses a wide range of topics, some of which are less contentious. For example, Wilson also provides strategies for instilling a strong work ethic in boys, as well as teaching them how to wisely manage their money.)

Evangelicalism in the US Military Post 9/11

According to Du Mez, evangelical influence within the US military exploded in the years following 9/11, as evangelicals sought to promote their aggressive model of masculinity in a military context. She argues that two evangelical organizations were crucial in purveying evangelical ideas in the military—namely, Focus on the Family and New Life Church.

Organization #1: Focus on the Family

Du Mez relates that in the 1990s, Dobson moved the Focus on the Family headquarters to Colorado Springs, the home of the US Air Force Academy. In Colorado Springs, Dobson molded his organization into a tool for conservative ends, at times associating himself with the Academy.

For example, in 2004 Dobson mobilized evangelicals in South Dakota to support conservative candidate John Thune, who opposed legalized abortion and gay marriage, ultimately helping Thune narrowly win the election for Senator. In another instance, Dobson helped defend Roy Moore, chief justice of the Alabama Supreme Court, for refusing to heed a federal order to remove a monument to the Ten Commandments from the state judicial building’s rotunda. And, according to Du Mez, Dobson was strengthening his ties with the Air Force Academy all the while, even having the Academy parachute in the “Keys of heaven” to the Focus on the Family headquarters.

(Shortform note: Since the 2020 publication of Jesus and John Wayne, Dobson has continued to support conservative social issues through another similar organization, the Dr. James Dobson Family Institute. For example, some of his 2023 newsletters included articles opposing gender-affirming care for children and the LGTBQ+ community while explicitly endorsing Christian nationalism—the view that Christianity is central to US national identity.)

Organization #2: New Life Church

While Focus on the Family had more subtle ties to the military, the evangelical megachurch New Life Church made its militarism explicit. Its founding pastor Ted Haggard modeled the church itself around the military—the church’s sanctuary matched the Air Force Academy’s color scheme, and its lobby featured a towering bronze sculpture of an angel brandishing a sword. New Life Church considered itself a “spiritual battleground” whose congregants were warriors for Christ.

(Shortform note: New Life Church’s militaristic undertones also influence evangelical theology more generally, as evangelicals typically believe that everyone participates in spiritual warfare where the enemies are Satan and his agents. According to this view, demonic forces often subject people to temptation, requiring vigilance and prayer to resist these supernatural influences.)

Du Mez relates that, to increase its influence inside the Air Force, New Life Church employed a wide array of strategies. For example, teams of pastors greeted cadets at the Air Force Academy’s chapel and invited them to Monday night Bible studies. Additionally, Du Mez reports that flyers for frequent screenings of Mel Gibson’s The Passion of the Christ were spread throughout the dining hall.

(Shortform note: Today, New Life Church in Colorado Springs continues to enjoy a tight-knit relationship with the armed forces—it has several ministries geared toward military members and bills itself as the “home church” for these members and their families. To continue attracting members of the military, the church offers weekly prayer time every Sunday that specifically seeks to pray for embattled soldiers worldwide.)

The Election of Donald Trump

The war mentality that evangelicals developed in the wake of 9/11, Du Mez writes, helped fuel evangelical support of Trump in the 2016 election. In this section, we’ll examine how Barack Obama’s perceived attacks on religious liberty further entrenched a sense of embattlement among evangelicals that would ultimately propel them to embrace Trump as the fulfillment of their militaristic view of masculinity.

The Precursor: Obama’s Alleged Attacks on Religious Liberty

Du Mez writes that Obama angered evangelicals even before his 2008 election. For example, she points to Obama’s qualified defense of his pastor, Reverend Jeremiah Wright, who used the phrase “God damn America” in a sermon railing against the US’s increased militarization. Because he defended Reverend Wright, evangelicals viewed Obama as lacking in the patriotism and love of country that they so dearly valued.

(Shortform note: Reverend Wright continued to accrue controversy for a series of remarks made between 2008 and 2011. For instance, following Israel’s 2008 invasion of Gaza, Wright remarked in an interview that “them Jews ain’t gonna let me talk to [Obama],” a comment which critics deemed conspiratorial antisemitism.)

However, this sense of evangelical embattlement grew yet stronger during Obama’s administration, as evangelicals viewed many of his policies as attacks on religious liberty. For instance, Obama’s Affordable Care Act (ACA) mandated coverage of contraceptives—a provision that, according to evangelical Christians, endangered their right to refuse to participate in practices contrary to their religion. More importantly, Du Mez notes that evangelicals often directed their ire toward Obama for the 2015 Supreme Court ruling that federally legalized same-sex marriage, again viewing it as an affront to religious freedom.

(Shortform note: In the wake of Donald Trump’s administration, which saw conservatives take a six-to-three majority on the US Supreme Court, conservative voters have won several perceived victories for religious liberty, contrary to the Obama years. For example, in 2023 the Supreme Court ruled in favor of a Colorado web designer who refused to create websites for same-sex weddings—a ruling that progressives lamented as a blow to LGBTQ+ rights and conservatives celebrated as a win for religious freedom. Additionally, the Court ruled in favor of postal worker Gerald Groff, who lost his job at the US Postal Service for refusing to work on Sundays.)

The Culmination: The Election of Donald Trump

In light of evangelical frustration toward Obama, it initially seemed that an evangelical conservative—such as Senator Ted Cruz of Texas, Senator Marco Rubio of Florida, or Governor Mike Huckabee of Arkansas—would win the Republican nomination. Yet, despite the surplus of evangelical candidates to choose from, Trump—a candidate who, Du Mez points out, was a thrice-married adulterer, contrary to evangelicals’ professed family values—was growing popular among evangelicals in July 2015. According to polls, 20% of white evangelicals preferred Trump as the Republican candidate, compared with 12% for Huckabee, 11% for Jeb Bush, and 5% for Cruz.

(Shortform note: While Trump already enjoyed strong support from evangelicals in the summer of 2015, his support from other Republican voters was even stronger: 24% of all Republican voters favored Trump for the Republican nomination, compared to 20% of evangelical voters. So, it stands to reason that non-evangelical Republicans were initially more supportive of Trump than evangelical Republicans.)

However, unlike the other evangelical candidates, Trump explicitly tapped into the militaristic aspect of evangelicalism. To show as much, Du Mez points to Trump’s 2020 convocation speech at Liberty University—the US’s largest evangelical university, founded by Jerry Falwell Sr. During his speech, Trump asserted that Christianity was “under siege” and he would protect it by vastly strengthening the military. Only three days later, Liberty President Jerry Falwell Jr. became the first prominent evangelical leader to endorse Trump, claiming that America needed a leader, not a Sunday school teacher—an endorsement that earned Trump the support of 37% of evangelicals, according to polls.

(Shortform note: Trump continued to use militaristic language well into his presidency. For example, he frequently lamented the alleged “war on Christmas,” claiming that non-Christians wanted to replace the phrase “Merry Christmas” with “Happy Holidays.” In an interview, Trump took credit for “[leading] the charge” against this “assault” on Christmas, further tapping into the militaristic language embraced by evangelicals.)

Du Mez acknowledges that Trump experienced initial pushback from evangelical leaders. For instance, Russell Moore—editor-in-chief of Christianity Today and former President of the Southern Baptist Convention’s Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission—criticized Trump’s anti-immigrant mentality and likened him to a “Bronze Age warlord.” But most evangelical leaders eventually fell into line: James Dobson endorsed Trump just before the election, and Wayne Grudem, co-editor of Recovering Biblical Manhood and Womanhood, endorsed Trump as a “morally good choice” and a patriot.

(Shortform note: Although many evangelical leaders eventually fell into line to support Trump, the same isn’t true of the leader of the Roman Catholic Church, Pope Francis. For example, Pope Francis harshly criticized Trump’s proposed immigration plan of building a wall along the Mexican-American border, arguing that those who think only about building walls are not Christians. This criticism continued into Trump’s presidency, with Pope Francis in 2017 lambasting Trump’s decision to rescind Obama’s Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program (DACA) that protected undocumented immigrants who arrived in the US as children.)

Du Mez notes that the result of Trump’s support from leaders like Dobson and Grudem was striking: 81% of white evangelicals voted for Trump, propelling him to victory in a narrow race over Hillary Clinton. And, Du Mez argues, support for Trump didn’t involve hypocrisy for evangelicals but an expression of their deepest values—namely, the brash, militant masculinity that had been growing stronger for the past century.