PDF Summary:Gettysburg, by Stephen W. Sears

Gettysburg, authored by Stephen W. Sears, provides a comprehensive analysis of the events surrounding the pivotal Battle of Gettysburg. Sears sheds light on the strategic decisions and unfolding events that led to the clash in Gettysburg, including the Confederacy's shift to an eastern strategy and the Union's efforts to monitor and respond to Lee's northern advances.

The book delves into the intricacies of the three-day battle itself, meticulously reconstructing the critical standoffs, assaults, and chain of command decisions that shaped the outcome. Sears offers an unbiased examination of both sides' decision-making processes, tactical choices, and the impacts of those choices over the course of the seminal conflict.

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Sears's account highlights the crucial role played by the area known as Devil's Den, characterized by its large granite boulders, which provided a defensive shield for the left flank of Sickles's elongated line. Hobart Ward's brigade was tasked with holding the defensive position. While Robertson's Texans clashed with Ward's soldiers atop Houck's Ridge, close to Devil’s Den, Law executed a tactical move involving two Alabama regiments to attack the side of the Union forces. The battle escalated as Benning's brigade, known as "Old Rock," engaged in combat, leading to the Union troops pulling back and the subsequent capture of Devil's Den by the Confederates.

The strategic decisions made by Warren and Vincent, coupled with the valiant forward movement of the 20th Maine, were pivotal in taking control of Little Round Top in the midst of the battle.

The precarious positioning of Dan Sickles' forces at Little Round Top nearly led to a disastrous outcome for the Union soldiers. When Chief Engineer Gouverneur Warren reached the heights at dusk on July 2 to inspect the position, he was appalled to find it unoccupied by any Federal forces except for a handful of signalmen at their station. Grasping the vital importance of the high ground, Warren instructed a brigade under General Sykes, commanded by Col. Strong Vincent, to seize it.

Sears presents a gripping account of Vincent's rapid organization of his four regiments into a defensive line moments before the Confederate brigades began their climb up the hill's southern face. In this stand-up fight, fought at close quarters in broken ground and amid a hailstorm of artillery fire, the odds for a Confederate victory appeared to be favorable, but at the last moment timely reinforcements—the 140th New York and other regiments of Stephen Weed's Fifth Corps brigade—bolstered the Union defense. Joshua Chamberlain and his 20th Maine regiment spearheaded a forceful counterattack on the extreme left of the Union line, effectively driving back the last attackers in a tumultuous battle marked by the clash of swords, the roar of guns, and exploding artillery.

The costly conflict in the Wheatfield, and Barksdale and Wilcox's repulsion at Cemetery Ridge

Following their expulsion from Devil's Den, Ward's troops, together with the remnants of de Trobriand's forces, regrouped effectively and, bolstered by the arrival of two unscathed brigades from James Barnes's division within the Fifth Corps, managed to effectively repel Kershaw's subsequent assaults from McLaws's division. The confrontation subsequently shifted to the north, to a wheat field belonging to John Rose. However, as Kershaw's assault appeared to be advancing, a command error halted its momentum, and during the pause required to rectify this error, reinforcements consisting of two brigades from Caldwell's division, sent by Hancock, successfully reinforced Sickles' position, regaining control of both the Wheatfield and Rose's Woods.

During the fierce battle, characterized by immediate and close-quarters fighting, General Caldwell witnessed the incapacitation of three out of his four brigade commanders, one of whom was Colonel Cross. Colonel Brooke sustained severe injuries, while at the same time, General Samuel K. Zook was fatally wounded. Subsequently, the Northern troops made a mistake. Brig. As the Confederates commenced their critical assault, General James Barnes, overseeing the area, had previously moved two of his divisions, leaving de Trobriand's Third Corps Brigade exposed. The Mississippi brigade under Barksdale launched a forceful attack on the Peach Orchard, then turned north, overpowering the Union artillery positions and eventually engaging with the significantly diminished troops of Caldwell. Wilcox's Alabama brigade advanced on Barksdale's flank, playing a role in the joint advance until Winfield Scott Hancock effectively stopped them by quickly organizing units from the Second, Third, First, and Fifth corps. As night approached, the Confederate troops took control of the Peach Orchard and advanced approximately 600 yards further, but their assault diminished, which consequently strengthened the defenses that General Meade had established along Cemetery Ridge.

Ewell's forces initiated their attack with an artillery barrage targeting Cemetery Hill and then moved forward to take possession of Culp's Hill.

General Ewell, keeping a close watch on the Union's right flank, was ready to intensify his artillery barrage into a comprehensive assault should an opportunity present itself, while simultaneously, Longstreet's forces were meeting with strong resistance on the left. Jubal Early, leading three brigades minus Smith's contingent, and Rodes, in charge of his four brigades, were tactically situated to initiate an attack on Cemetery Hill from the town's northern and northwestern areas. Ewell intended to execute a strategy enabling his forces to maneuver around the adversary's position. Securing Culp's Hill, which lies east of Cemetery Hill, would provide a dominant vantage point over all the Union troops.

The troops of the Confederacy experienced good fortune during the second day of July's battle. Due to a mistake, Henry Slocum sent the majority of the Twelfth Corps to counter Longstreet's attack in the southwest, which meant that Ewell faced only the brigade of 1,400 men under the command of the seasoned engineer George Sears Greene, whose expertly constructed defenses turned a potential defeat into a deadlock. Ewell's three brigades, although they failed to remove Greene's forces from the top and northern side of the hill, were somewhat more successful on its lower eastern side. The unit from Maryland under Steuart's command took control of abandoned Northern defenses, thus establishing control over a substantial segment of the hill's lower incline and demonstrating their superiority in that region.

The third day of the battle was marked by a significant offensive that has come to be referred to as Pickett's Charge.

Sears explores the history leading up to what is known as Pickett's Charge, revealing a story in which the Confederacy's missteps and miscalculations culminated in the unsuccessful outcome of this infamous assault.

Hunt devised a countermeasure against the bombardment from the Confederate forces.

As dusk settled on July's second day, a clearly distressed Robert E. Lee decided to press on with the attack the next day, in line with the overarching battle plan. The strategy relied on the utilization of George E. Pickett's division, which, despite previous engagements, remained determined, and would be reinforced by troops from other units within the First Corps under Longstreet as well as from divisions that were part of A. P. Hill's Third Corps. Lee's offensive targeted the specific section of Cemetery Ridge that had almost succumbed in the previous day's assault. An initial bombardment was intended to prepare the scene before Pickett's charge began.

Sears offers a thorough examination of the artillery configurations, emphasizing the unevenness in command and expertise, with the Union's Henry Hunt directing his troops with proficiency and utilizing skilled artillerymen, while the Confederate forces suffered from a lack of comparable talent under William N. Pendleton's direction. Hunt’s artillerymen at Gettysburg, manning some 119 guns in the battle line, had a decisive edge in numbers, quality of ordnance, and especially quality and supply of ammunition. Hunt's strategy to counter the Confederate artillery onslaught and the ensuing attack distinguished him from Pendleton.

The Union's artillery assault had greatly reduced the numbers of Pettigrew's and Trimble's advancing forces.

The bombardment's primary goal was to incapacitate the enemy's artillery, thus clearing pathways for the infantry's advance. It opened with more than 160 Confederate guns, massed in a long line behind Seminary Ridge, unleashing on command a deafening barrage. As the day advanced and the sun climbed to its highest point, the Southern forces were evidently struggling significantly under the intense bombardment. At first, the Union artillerymen adhered to directives to limit their use of ammunition, but they soon joined the fray with equal intensity as their opponents, unaffected by the defective ammunition that plagued the Confederate side.

Moreover, the Confederate forces were at a disadvantage due to the absence of a unified artillery commander to oversee their firing operations. The task of coordinating the complex attack was entrusted to subordinates under Pendleton, who lacked the requisite authority and power for successful execution. The units of artillery functioned autonomously, frequently selecting their targets based only on what they could see. The operators of the Southern artillery experienced considerably diminished visibility due to the smoke produced by their cannons. The effectiveness of various artillery units was considerably diminished because they had to use solid shot to prevent harming their own forces stationed in front of them. In contrast, Hunt adeptly amassed his artillery, which enabled a powerful barrage from the side. Hunt consistently took personal charge on-site, directing activities himself.

The collapse of the Confederate left and the conflict that ensued at the Angle.

Pickett's division, instead of forming the left wing of the attack, was able to temporarily evade the most intense Union artillery barrages by utilizing a slight depression, unlike the brigades led by Pettigrew and Trimble, which lacked this geographical benefit. The arrangement and slowing of their troops played a role in the unfolding events, akin to the influence exerted by Pickett's forward movement. When they reached the Emmitsburg Road, they positioned themselves a significant gap away, no less than 200 yards from Pickett's troops, directly exposing themselves to the Union infantry's gunfire.

The narrative by Sears highlights the tactical brilliance associated with Henry Hunt. The commencement of Pickett's charge on the left flank resulted in devastating casualties, largely as a result of a synchronized onslaught of cannon fire, incorporating side attacks from Cemetery Hill and the contributions of a reserve artillery contingent under the command of Colonel Freeman McGilvery, as well as the offensive from forces positioned on Little Round Top. The 8th Ohio Regiment, led by Colonel Sawyer, carried out a synchronized volley of gunfire that greatly diminished the strength of the attack. Upon crossing the Emmitsburg Road, the survivors were met with a fierce and accurately directed onslaught of bullets from the troops led by Alexander Hays. At the critical juncture when the intensity of the artillery barrage lessened, Winfield Scott Hancock took decisive action by leading the 1st Minnesota regiment into battle, successfully impeding the advance of the Confederate forces.

The unsuccessful push by Wilcox and Lang on the right wing, along with the main assault being driven back

Under Hancock and Hays' leadership, the troops bravely withstood the fierce attack by Pettigrew's and Trimble's brigades at the Union's stone wall defense line, while Pickett's Virginians, situated further south, steadfastly moved toward the position occupied by Gibbon's men. The assault led by Pickett faced significant obstacles due to an intense flanking artillery fire, particularly from the units under Captain Andrew Cowan of the 1st New York Independent Battery and Lieutenant George Woodruff from Battery I of the 1st U.S. Artillery. Until that point, Pickett's division had largely been spared the significant casualties that had predominantly affected the Confederate line's left flank. Now, however, to square the advance with Pettigrew's brigades and to avoid being caught between two enemy forces, Pickett ordered his division on a 45-degree left oblique, to march northward along the length of the Emmitsburg Road. His tactical move led to the positioning of his forces in close proximity to the Union foot soldiers.

Sears offers a thorough account of the final agonizing moments of Pickett's charge, describing how it fell apart near a fortification referred to as the Angle, and adjacent to a modest cluster of trees slightly to the south. Despite engaging with a disorganized and vulnerable line due to a command mistake that left a significant gap at the Angle, Pickett's troops faced intense cannon and rifle fire, causing severe disarray. In a decisive move, Norman Hall of the Union forces adeptly maneuvered three regiments to engage the adversary's side, and to clinch the final triumph, Gibbon's backup troops, bolstered by the Vermont Brigade on their right, launched a comprehensive assault, surrounding the exhausted Confederate soldiers. The troops positioned at the barricade, who had neither been wounded nor killed, faced a critical choice: whether to retreat or surrender. The attack on the right flank, belatedly launched by an overburdened Longstreet and spearheaded by Wilcox and Lang, only served to highlight the comprehensive nature of the defeat.

Practical Tips

• You can enhance decision-making skills by playing strategy-based board games that simulate battlefield tactics. Games like "Risk" or "Axis & Allies" require players to make strategic decisions similar to those made by commanders at Gettysburg, such as positioning troops, deciding when to attack or retreat, and anticipating opponents' moves. This can help improve your ability to assess situations and make critical decisions under pressure.
• Improve your problem-solving abilities by participating in historical reenactment groups. By taking on the roles of different brigades and following the historical strategies used at Gettysburg, you'll gain a hands-on understanding of how terrain, positioning, and timing can affect outcomes. This experience can translate into better strategic thinking in your personal and professional life as you learn to consider various factors and potential consequences before acting.
• Develop your leadership and teamwork skills by organizing a hiking group to traverse terrains similar to those at Gettysburg, such as hills, woods, and open fields. Assign roles to each member, such as navigator, pace-setter, and logistics coordinator, to mimic the chain of command and cooperative efforts of the battle. This activity will teach you how to lead a group, delegate tasks, and work together to achieve a common goal, mirroring the collaborative efforts of military units.

The decision-making structures and chains of command within the armies of both the North and the South.

The Union's command faced a critical juncture.

Sears, in recounting the Federal army's high-command struggles leading up to and during the battle, offers perceptive assessments of the leadership skills of Joe Hooker, John Reynolds, and George Meade, and analyzes Lincoln's role as commander-in-chief.

Following the battle at Chancellorsville, Hooker faced challenges due to disunity among his subordinate officers.

Following the disastrous defeat at Fredericksburg, General Joe Hooker took command of the disheartened Union forces. Upon assuming command, he effectively revitalized the morale of his soldiers, which had suffered under the leadership of Ambrose E. Burnside. He reorganized the army and in the initial days of May at Chancellorsville, he was on the brink of a significant victory by outflanking the opposing Southern commander with more advantageous strategic placement.

The defeat at Chancellorsville was the pivotal element that shaped the fate of General Hooker. Hooker compounded the humiliation of his loss by publicly chastising three of his corps commanders, alleging that Howard's leadership of the Eleventh Corps faltered during Jackson's attack, casting doubts on Sedgwick's command capabilities while he was incapacitated, and censuring Stoneman for his utter failure to carry out the orders he received. The behavior of Hooker led to a united front of dissent among his subordinates. The conspirators who had once conspired against Burnside shifted their focus to oust Hooker, aiming to elevate Meade to the command position. Sears argues that the internal workings of the administration caused considerable anguish for President Lincoln, especially because of the alliances Henry Halleck had formed.

President Lincoln initially stood by Hooker but ultimately chose to dismiss him from his command.

Despite their doubts regarding his command capabilities, not a single one of Hooker's senior officers, such as Couch, Sedgwick, Hancock, or Reynolds, demonstrated a readiness to take over his role. President Lincoln maintained his confidence in General Hooker's command, feeling that he deserved another chance to demonstrate his military prowess.

President Lincoln considered it crucial to alter the command structure because of a critical error attributed to Hooker. Hooker, determined to seize the significant military resources at Harper's Ferry for his campaign, encountered opposition from Halleck on this matter. Halleck's opposition only exacerbated Hooker's inherently unstable temperament. Meade and Warren concurred with Hooker's assessment that Harper's Ferry constituted a strategic disadvantage. The command at the fort, under the leadership of William French, should disregard any directives from General Hooker, following Halleck's instructions. Joe Hooker promptly submitted his resignation.

The appointment of Meade as Hooker's successor had a significant impact on both the structure of command within the army and the morale of the soldiers.

The high-ranking officers of the Potomac's army made their choice for Hooker's successor evident, which led President Lincoln to swiftly appoint George Gordon Meade as the new commander. The change in leadership had little to no impact on the morale of the common soldiers. Under Joe Hooker's command, the morale and assurance of his soldiers experienced a significant revival, contrasting sharply with their state following the previous December's Battle of Fredericksburg.

The army experienced its fifth shift in command within a span of two years during the conflict, sparking more interest than excitement. The military commanders displayed their enthusiasm without any ambiguity. The soldiers had committed their allegiance to Meade, as he was a member of their ranks. The corps commanders demonstrated a notably higher degree of loyalty and regard under Meade's leadership compared to when Hooker was in charge, which had led to a reduction in confidence from the military. Meade admitted to significant unease when he was named commander just as the battle was about to begin. George Meade fully recognized the substantial responsibility that came with his command.

Lee encountered significant challenges while leading his forces.

The book scrutinizes the tactical blunders Lee committed while devising the campaign's strategy. The author's examination is perceptive and show a thoughtful comprehension of the key Confederate leader.

Ewell's advance on July's initial day was impeded due to a lack of clear directives from his superiors.

Lee's lack of explicit instructions on the first day of July had a profound impact on how the conflict unfolded. The night before, Lee instructed Ewell to move his corps toward either Cashtown or Gettysburg, depending on how the situation unfolded, and on the morning of July 1, Lee sent a messenger to reinforce the adaptability of the orders, directing him to head to Cashtown or Gettysburg as the circumstances required. Lee did not communicate his objectives clearly, which resulted in Dick Ewell having to deduce them without specific instructions. Ewell faced a challenging decision, further complicated by Lee's instruction to refrain from starting a major battle until his entire army had gathered.

Had Ewell joined forces with the main Confederate contingent near Cashtown on July first, adding his corps' might to Lee's initial clash with the enemy, it is likely that the battle would have been delayed until the next day. Hill commenced an initial attack to provoke a response from the enemy forces. Ewell acted with prompt decisiveness at the crucial time. Upon reaching the location, Lee grasped the circumstances and transitioned from a preliminary reconnaissance to an all-out confrontation. The lack of a cohesive strategy and the ensuing lack of a coordinated plan of attack were key factors in the precarious position of the Confederate forces at the start of the fighting, which in turn impacted the efficiency of Lee's broader military maneuvers.

The divergence in military strategies between Lee and Longstreet

On the initial day of combat, the Confederate forces encountered difficulties stemming from commands that were ambiguous and lacking in detail, while the following days involved a steadfast clash of wills between Robert E. Lee and James Longstreet over their conflicting strategic approaches. Longstreet supported the idea of moving into Pennsylvania to initiate an attack, following Lee's strategic direction. Longstreet advocated for a strategy that combined proactive tactics with a fundamental emphasis on maintaining defensive stances during combat. Longstreet believed that the Southern forces would stand a better chance of victory if they could draw their adversaries into attacking on ground that was to their advantage, despite being outnumbered.

Sears argues that Lee's choice to launch an attack on Meade's troops stationed at Cemetery Ridge failed to consider an essential element of their initial battle plan. Lee's choice to initiate combat hinged on stale information, erroneously suggesting Meade's forces remained in Maryland, culminating in an accidental clash on ground disadvantageous to the Southern army. Longstreet persistently expressed his disapproval of the command to assault, not only on July second but also maintaining his opposition into the next day. On the second of July, Lee took charge of the offensive, issuing detailed orders to the leader of McLaws' division due to Longstreet's hesitation. Sears views this occurrence as evidence of Lee's steadfast commitment to the strategy he had selected for the battle.

Stuart's missing cavalry, which would have provided reconnaissance, significantly influenced Lee's tactical choices during the Battle of Gettysburg.

Jeb Stuart's audacious and perilous maneuver to outflank Hooker stands out as an especially unnecessary and ill-timed venture in the annals of the Confederacy's military endeavors. The concept was born out of an atmosphere filled with excessive self-assurance. Stuart, along with Lee who had even greater confidence in him, believed he could navigate through or break past the Union forces without hindrance, thereby disrupting their lines of communication and gathering vital intelligence to aid the advance of the Confederate foot soldiers, with his main objective being to collect essential information.

Sears concludes that although Stuart's roundabout maneuvers effectively disrupted Hooker's communications, the strategy incurred a considerably higher cost. During the crucial two-day clash, the Confederate forces were engaged in combat without the essential information and scouting usually supplied by their cavalry. The enemy forces' advance on July first took Lee by surprise. During a pivotal moment when accurate intelligence on Meade's forces was essential, Lee had no choice but to depend on secondhand reports, rumors, and details obtained from prisoners. The situation saw a marginal improvement when a dust-covered and exhausted Stuart, after his extended nine-day ride, at last joined forces with Lee. His self-regard for his strategic acumen was at odds with his failure to gather sufficient intelligence, which hampered his capacity to make sound tactical decisions when confronting opponents.

Hill's lack of decisive leadership, coupled with his passive handling of his duties in the role of a corps commander.

The choice by Robert E. Lee to elevate A.P. Hill to command the newly established Third Corps within the Army of Northern Virginia is often viewed as one of his more questionable decisions. Hill's reputation was enhanced by his courageous behavior in battle, which particularly impressed Lee because of his tactical achievements at Chancellorsville. Hill often demonstrated a deficiency in skillfully managing his troops. He frequently behaved impulsively and showed a disregard for tactfulness, which affected not only his subordinates but also those in higher command.

Sears suggests that the primary reason for the Confederacy's loss at Gettysburg was Hill's ineffective leadership. On July first, he inadvertently supplied Harry Heth with a scouting party that was too significant to avoid confrontation, leading to an unexpected clash that neither Hill nor Lee had anticipated. Hill made his mistake worse by deciding to stay at his command post that morning rather than advancing with Heth to evaluate the opposition's force and manage the conflict. Throughout the second and third days of July, Hill's presence was minimal, offering neither notable guidance nor organizational contributions to the operations of the Third Corps. Lee's plan for a significant assault on July 3 necessitated swift changes, and although Hill had reservations, he was tasked with the duty of contributing six brigades for the forefront of the attack. However, his lack of assessment of his forces' condition and failure to manage their deployment led to disastrous results.

General Meade's approach to leadership

In this section, the author assesses how General Meade directed the operations of the Army of the Potomac during the Gettysburg campaign. The insightful decisions and quick actions of General Meade led to a victorious result.

Reliance on intelligence sources to direct army operations

Upon taking charge, Meade evaluated his troops' spirits and their condition, and he was equally focused on determining the whereabouts of the enemy forces. Meade stood out as an efficient administrator with a strong focus on sharing intelligence, unlike Hooker who showed less propensity for such dissemination. He established his headquarters in Taneytown, on the route leading to Baltimore, twelve miles away from Gettysburg, where he gathered his subordinate officers to discuss preliminary strategies.

Sears emphasizes the pivotal role that intelligence played in shaping the strategic decisions of Meade, who led the military forces. Before the battle began, Meade had reliable intelligence on the whereabouts of two of Lee's divisions and a fairly accurate evaluation of the enemy's capabilities. Meade's edge was due to the thorough intelligence gathered by the Bureau of Military Information, whereas Lee relied on secondhand information, indirect reports, and questioning prisoners.

Meade conducted a personal inspection and held conversations prior to deciding on the location for the battle.

Upon recognizing that Lee's forces were moving forward over South Mountain toward Gettysburg, Meade began to assemble his soldiers in that vicinity. I made a firm decision to

Other Perspectives

• While Hooker did improve morale, some historians argue that his reorganization of the army was equally important in preparing the Union for future engagements.
• The disunity among Hooker's officers could be seen as a reflection of broader systemic issues within the Union army's high command, rather than solely Hooker's leadership style.
• The public chastisement of his corps commanders by Hooker might be interpreted as a necessary measure to enforce discipline and accountability, though it was risky in terms of maintaining unity.
• Lincoln's decision to stand by Hooker initially could be criticized as a delay in making a necessary change in leadership, potentially prolonging the Union's struggles.
• The impact of Meade's appointment on soldiers' morale could be debated, as some might argue that the common soldiers were less concerned with high command and more focused on immediate survival and battlefield concerns.
• Lee's lack of clear instructions to Ewell might be defended as a strategic choice to allow for flexibility and adaptability on the battlefield.
• The strategic disagreements between Lee and Longstreet could be seen as a healthy part of military deliberation, with each general advocating for what they believed was the best approach.
• Stuart's absence and the resulting lack of cavalry intelligence could be argued as a calculated risk that unfortunately did not pay off, rather than a clear-cut mistake.
• Hill's leadership style and his actions at Gettysburg could be viewed in the context of the fog of war and the challenges inherent in commanding a corps during a major battle.
• Meade's reliance on intelligence and his methodical approach to battle planning could be criticized for potentially leading to missed opportunities for more aggressive action that could have ended the war sooner.