PDF Summary:Bowling Alone, by Robert D. Putnam
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In his groundbreaking book Bowling Alone, political scientist Robert D. Putnam argues that the social glue holding the US together—its social capital—is breaking down. Social capital—the value of cohesive relationships and networks—differs from the types of capital that economists study (such as financial and physical resources). Social capital enriches people and communities by enabling mutual trust, support, and communication. But after peaking in the 1950s, the US’s social capital has fallen, even as other forms of capital have risen.
Putnam warns that if the US’s social glue keeps fraying, the collective social systems we rely on could dissolve. In this guide, we’ll explore Putnam’s argument that social capital is vital to society, and we’ll follow as he tries to solve the mystery of what caused its decline in the first place. We’ll look at whether these social trends have continued into the 21st century, examine different views on what causes social change, and see how various organizations use social capital for the betterment of all.
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Despite its benefits to society, the trajectory of American community involvement reversed in the decades of the 1960s and ’70s. What strikes Putnam as especially peculiar is that this decline in social involvement appears in every segment of American society, regardless of demographic, economic, or geographic factors. Whatever changed in American life was to a large extent universal. Where the blow hit hardest was in activities that require cooperation with others, such as taking part in community events or being active in local organizations. Civic activities that saw less of a decline were those you can engage in on an individual basis, such as sending letters to public officials (or, in the modern age, posting comments on a website).
Formal social interactions aren’t the only ones to slowly vanish during this time. Putnam’s research shows that informal gatherings have also declined since around 1970. By 2000, studies have shown a 45% drop in the number of times people visit with friends or even hold family dinners. Instead, people have shifted their focus to solitary pastimes as opposed to interactive events. In particular, he cites athletics as an example—attendance at sporting events has only increased, but the number of people playing sports has gone down. Today, we’re more likely to go watch a baseball game than to personally join a local softball league.
The Cost of Social Disconnection
Though Putnam describes the many ways in which American society has grown untethered, other researchers have explored the psychological effects of that disconnection. In Lost Connections, as mentioned before, Johann Hari connects the dots between our growing social isolation and feelings of anxiety and depression—a problem that’s rooted in human evolution. Millions of years ago, the only way for humans to survive was to band together into tribes. People who felt depressed when they wandered off were more motivated to stick with the tribe, and so they were more likely than loners to survive. In other words, we’re all descended from those early humans with the strongest negative reactions to social isolation.
Putnam’s numbers reveal a drop in social connections, but Hari cites research that’s even more bleak: A 1980s study showed that the average American had three close friends; by 2004, that number dropped to zero. The problem isn’t just that we need to spend more time with others—it’s that our connections aren’t meaningful. Hari argues that to reap the psychological rewards of socializing, you need to be part of mutually caring relationships. Social organizations offer a platform to build those connections, but it takes more effort than simple attendance to create the sense of meaning and deep friendship that makes them beneficial.
Where We Come Together
The slow disappearance of social organizations begs the question of how people connect with each other today and whether they’ve simply shifted from old communal structures to something new. For instance, Putnam writes that traditionally, churches have been the US’s deepest wells of social capital—not necessarily for religious reasons, but because they serve as gathering places for so many social activities, such as support groups, networking events, community forums, and large potluck dinners. However, even as religious beliefs remained largely unchanged over the time of Putnam’s research, actual church attendance went down, weakening them as social capital generators.
(Shortform note: This trend remains unabated—a 2020 Gallup poll revealed that for the first time, less than 50% of US adults were members of a church, while the number who claimed no religion at all rose above 20%. In The Great Dechurching, Jim Davis and Michael Graham argue that the main reason for many people leaving organized religion is practicality—they see church attendance as an inconvenience when they have so many other pressing demands on their time. However, many younger Americans also report leaving religion because they see church culture as overly judgmental and behind the times on many current social issues.)
Notably, this drop in church membership—as well as participation in other social groups—is primarily a generational shift. Individuals don’t lose their interest in social participation, but each generation since the 1950s has shown weaker interest in their parents’ institutions. Naturally, this leads Putnam to ask if new institutions have replaced the old ones. For most of the time period in question, this doesn’t seem to be the case, since it wasn’t until the 1990s that the internet became a widespread tool for people to unite around common interests.
(Shortform note: While Putnam looks at the 20th century’s weakening of institutions as a singular event, it may be part of a larger historic cycle. In Principles for Dealing with the Changing World Order, Ray Dalio argues that civilizations like the US go through stages of increased harmony, when people cooperate and society flourishes, followed by times of disharmony, where civil society weakens and falls apart. When a society reaches its peak, Dalio writes that those born to wealth and power take it for granted and don’t do the work to maintain the social system that supports them. At their most extreme, these cycles end in violence as conflicts break out over cultural values, wealth distribution, and political power.)
Unfortunately, the internet hasn’t become an effective replacement for in-person interactions. During the time of Putnam’s initial research, the internet was still a novelty, but in his 2020 update he observes that despite its nonstop connectivity, the internet has failed to recreate the social capital of a century before. Even “digital natives” born in the internet era find in-person contact superior to that online. What Putnam’s continued research shows is that the most effective online networks are those that combine virtual and in-person interactions, whether by serving as an initial meeting place to bring people together later in an offline setting, or as a way to continue communication in between more personal interactions.
(Shortform note: One reason the internet fails to create real social capital may be biological. In Out of Touch, psychologist Michelle Drouin explains that online interactions engage different hormones in the brain—interactions on the internet produce a mild reward of the pleasure hormone dopamine, whereas meaningful, intimate real-world connections trigger the release of oxytocin, which promotes social bonding and feelings of attachment. Since the dopamine cycle is easier to trigger, constant online connectivity has led us to an era of internet addiction, which in turn has produced what researchers are calling an “intimacy famine” in which people are starved for real social connections because of their fixation on digital devices.)
Replacing Connection With Money
Putnam highlights another trend that reflects the US’s lower civic involvement—as a country, Americans are using financial capital to replace social capital. What were once grassroots volunteer organizations have increasingly become professionalized, such as political parties and advocacy groups that focus on particular issues. In the past, people came together locally to support causes such as civil rights or the environment—forging community bonds and learning social skills in the process. However, today people are far more likely to write checks to large, national groups that employ professional lobbyists on their behalf. This may be a more efficient way to make an impact, but it negates the side effect of building community around a cause.
(Shortform note: In Doing Good Better, William MacAskill, one of the founders of the effective altruism movement, takes the idea of maximizing philanthropic efficiency to its logical extreme, going so far as to provide mathematical formulae to calculate the most positive use of time and money. However, MacAskill seems to assume that monetary donations are the default way to support a cause. When proponents of effective altruism discuss building social capital, it’s usually in terms of encouraging donations and solidifying the reputation of the nonprofit sector. The community-building side of effective altruism, which Putnam might prize above the rest, is mainly aimed at guiding people toward careers where they can make a philanthropic impact.)
The Effect on Politics
As beneficial as “effective altruism” may be, Putnam argues that outsourcing civic engagement to professionals comes with unintended societal costs. For example, while the US’s political parties have become increasingly better funded, actual community participation has dropped—including voter turnout at elections, which fell 25% from 1960-1996 despite initiatives to make voting accessible. Putnam points out that individuals aren’t voting less—someone who voted in 1980 was just as likely to vote in 1992—but each successive generational cohort has a lower turnout rate than the one before.
(Shortform note: As a result of the decline Putnam discusses, the US has one of the lowest per capita voting rates among democratic nations. The difference is not due solely to American disinterest—some countries implement policy measures to increase voter participation. One strategy is mandatory voting—in countries like Australia, Belgium, and Peru, failing to vote results in fines. Another strategy is proportional representation, in which a legislature’s makeup is determined by the total number of votes a party receives in a nationwide election. This approach negates the practice of creating “safe” legislative seats in noncompetitive districts—and lets voters feel that their votes matter, which polls show many Americans don’t feel.)
Putnam writes that another consequence is polarization—as more people withdraw from active politics, the ones who remain are those with the strongest opinions and most extreme views. Civil debate and cooperation vanish, fueling a cycle of noise that discourages even-tempered people from returning to the civic fold.
(Shortform note: In the 21st century, combative political polarization has further pushed moderates away from civic participation by inducing significant voter fatigue. Pew Research Center polls show increasing levels of voter exhaustion and general frustration with the US’s political system. Young voters in particular report feeling discouraged by the repetitive nature of American elections, the neverending political news coverage, and the sheer amounts of bad information now prevalent in online media. The result is exactly as Putnam predicted—highly motivated partisans vote in elections while others elect not to participate.)
What’s Killing Social Capital?
Beyond confirming that the US’s social cohesion is on the wane, Putnam’s research has another purpose—namely, to identify the cause. Due to the complexity and the pervasive nature of the issue, Putnam identifies a number of factors that contribute to declining social capital. As we’ll explore in the following sections, the unravelling of America’s civic unity results from a combination of modern worklife and suburban sprawl, the spread of mass media entertainment, and differences between generations.
Before diving into what’s causing public disengagement, there’s one excuse that Putnam rejects—namely, that people today are too busy. On the contrary, Putnam’s data shows that the people who are the busiest are also the most active in community groups. While full-time jobs do subtract from how much time you can spend in group events or social clubs, work balances this loss with other forms of connection, such as participation in professional associations and taking part in business activities that promote community growth. The tradeoff between work and private life isn’t equally balanced, but Putnam attributes no more than a fraction of our social decline to being too busy at work.
(Shortform note: While busyness may not be a statistical factor in the decline of social capital, the nature of work might play a role in the US’s growing internal divisions. In Bullshit Jobs, David Graeber argues that many modern forms of employment, especially in the white-collar sector, serve no purpose for society. These jobs exist for a variety of reasons—economic, political, and cultural—but their net effect is to make workers unhappy and to sow resentment between social classes. Graeber suggests that for many people, especially blue-collar workers, it’s hard to form social bonds with others if you see them earning higher pay for doing less work than you.)
Life In Suburbia
An argument Putnam finds more compelling is that changes to where we live and work have broken traditional communities apart by geographically distancing aspects of society. For instance, as city workers have steadily moved out to surrounding towns, those suburbs have become increasingly segregated by ethnicity and income level. Putnam also notes that even within these homogeneous suburbs, neighbors tend to isolate themselves and avoid taking part in community activities. The rates of civic engagement are much higher in true “small towns” that have retained their character, rather than those that have been transformed into bedroom communities for big-city commuters.
(Shortform note: The suburban segregation Putnam writes about may be deliberate—in The Color of Law, Richard Rothstein argues that this division results from explicit government policies. Even after the Supreme Court ruled racial zoning unconstitutional, Rothstein writes that government officials resorted to discriminatory zoning laws to maintain racial separation. For example, ordinances that limit neighborhoods to single-family homes exclude lower-income families who can only afford apartments. Because African Americans have been historically discriminated against in the job market, these single-family areas remain predominantly white while areas that allow multifamily dwellings become largely African American.)
The commute from the suburbs to downtown is also a problem. Putnam notes that instead of spending time with each other, Americans now spend more time alone in their cars than ever before. As urban sprawl continues, this trend grows worse and worse, increasing personal feelings of isolation and taking away valuable time that we might otherwise spend with family, friends, and other social groups. From data correlating travel time with community involvement, Putnam concludes that every 10 minutes added to a commute decreases a person’s community involvement by around 10%—a number that compounds as you move farther from your job.
(Shortform note: American commuting went through a sudden reversal thanks to the rise of remote work during and after Covid-19, despite many businesses’ attempts to draw workers back into the office. However, as of 2025, US highways remain congested, in part due to the rise of home delivery and ride-share services, and partly because remote workers are moving away from urban centers—necessitating longer drives when they do have to go to the city. This change in commuting isn’t necessarily the boon for social capital that Putnam’s numbers might suggest. Working from home means losing the casual workplace interactions that let people create lasting professional relationships, not to mention friendships with coworkers.)
Lastly, Putnam calls attention to the fact that suburbanization has separated work, home, and other social settings so that they never overlap. In the era of tightly knit communities, people who worked together also lived near each other, shopped at the same stores, and went to the same events. You’d run into the same people on your lunch break that you’d meet at your child’s football game. However, when you drive into the city or a different suburb for anything you do, there’s no consistency between the people you meet at work, when you’re walking your dog, or when you’re out buying clothes. Putnam argues that suburbia has turned us into a nation of strangers with no communal identity to act as a seed for social capital.
(Shortform note: Since Bowling Alone’s initial publication, researchers have noted a reduction in the number of “third places” in American society—places outside of home and work where people come together to socialize. In addition to the social settings Putnam lists, these also include public libraries, cafés, and public parks where people congregate. As a result, people spend less time with friends—an effect Putnam already predicted—but it also means that people spend more time at places where they have to work, whether at their jobs or doing chores at home. As “third places” vanish, not only do we have fewer stores of social capital—we also have fewer ways to escape the grind of our daily responsibilities.)
Television Overload
In addition to his case against suburban sprawl, Putnam says that an even greater drain on social capital is time spent in front of the television. He cites studies showing evidence of the harm TV does to community life. It replaces time spent socializing and participating in organized group activities, and continual TV use trains people to be passive and apathetic, turning its users into stereotypical “couch potatoes.” What Putnam finds interesting is that in general, people don’t consider watching TV to be more enjoyable than social interactions, but the minimal effort it requires makes TV a tempting substitute at the end of a long, tiring day.
In his analysis, Putnam is clear that though TV-watching seems to correspond with community disengagement, correlation does not imply causation—both could be triggered by some external factor. Nevertheless, Putnam finds it damning that the downturn in the US’s social capital lines up almost exactly with the widespread adoption of TV in American homes. This change happened quickly in the 1950s, and by the 1960s an entire generation of children were growing up with TV as a major focus of attention in their lives. Putnam concludes that despite its benefits, TV has made leisure a private activity, not a community experience.
The Wider Effects of Television and Digital Media
Long before Putnam’s research, others were sounding the warning about TV’s negative impact on society. In 1985’s Amusing Ourselves to Death, Neil Postman wrote that in addition to reducing the amount of time we spend together, television redefined culture itself by turning everything into entertainment. Instead of engaging in political discourse, we elect officials based on how their television image makes us feel. TV turns religious leaders into celebrities who need to create a spectacle to attract and hold an audience, negating the traditional faith experience. In education, Postman argues that TV sabotages schooling by teaching children to respond to images rather than developing their language skills.
What neither Putnam nor Postman could have anticipated was how the invention of the smartphone would move passive entertainment out of the TV room and into our pockets. Now, technology draws us away from social interactions even when we’re around other people—a phenomenon researchers call technoference—more colloquially known as “phone snubbing” or “phubbing.” For instance, couples sharing a meal or friends spending time together at the park are today very likely to split their attention between the people they’re with and scrolling through video clips on their phones. Especially among young people, technoference erodes interpersonal connections and poisons the well of future social capital.
Generational Divides
When adding up the different factors that might explain the US’s falling civic participation, Putnam suggests that the largest contributor of all is a sharp change in generational attitudes, stemming from the timing of geopolitical events and technological changes across the 20th century. On this point, Putnam takes care to distinguish between changes within generations that take place as a population ages and changes between generations that occur because of experiences one cohort shares that other generations do not. For instance, children of the 1950s and ’60s grew up in a time of rapid economic growth that wasn’t matched by the experiences of their parents or their children, who both grew up in times of economic turmoil.
Putnam states that approximately half of the US’s measurable decline in civic-focused behavior is the result of generational change. In other words, individuals don’t grow less invested in their communities—instead, each generation is less civic-oriented than the one that came before. This, of course, begs the question: What is happening to entire generations that’s making them lose interest in civic life? Putnam’s answer is twofold—as mentioned before, one divide was TV. Those who grew up before it were accustomed to more social participation in their lives. Putnam also argues that World War II constitutes another generational divide.
Generational Cycles
Putnam specifically discusses how the baby boom generation differs from those before and after, but without the standard generational labels that are commonly applied today. The Center for Generational Kinetics says that in general, the Silent generation was born before 1945, Generation X followed the boomers from roughly 1965-1976, Millennials came next (1977-1995), and Gen Z (1996 onward). A new label, Gen Alpha, has been proposed for children born after 2010. Each of these generations has gone through major world events and societal changes at different stages of life, such as the 9/11 terror attacks that briefly increased the US’s social cohesion, and the Covid-19 pandemic, with its negative impact on social capital and the institutions that create it.
In The Fourth Turning, published shortly before Bowling Alone, William Strauss and Neil Howe present a theory of generational differences not tied to specific historical events that might help to explain the changes Putnam sees. Strauss and Howe see generations as cyclical, conforming to four archetypes—“prophets” born in times of plenty, “nomads” who grow estranged from society, “heroes” who come of age in times of unrest, and “artists” who create new social structures during and after a great crisis.
Strauss and Howe equate these archetypes with the four post-World War II generations, tracking with the loss of trust in social institutions that Putnam describes. Their predictions for the crises that would shape the 21st century were eerily accurate, but they also offer hope that people will eventually come together, create new social norms, restore trust in institutions,and replenish the US’s social capital, as was done prior to 1945.
The World War II Surplus of Social Capital
Instead of just dwelling on the loss of social capital in the century’s latter half, Putnam turns to the first half of the 20th century and asks what factors caused social capital to rise. He hypothesizes that world-shaking events united Americans for a common purpose more strongly than any crisis we’ve faced since—namely, the Great Depression and, to an even greater extent, the Second World War. The Depression made Americans work collectively through union-building and political action to carry each other through its economic hardships. World War II followed right on its heels, uniting the country to face a common enemy.
(Shortform note: It would be inaccurate to suggest that there was no divisiveness in the response to the Depression. In large part, the US’s recovery was driven by President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s economic agenda, referred to as the New Deal, which was met with significant public criticism. On one side, figures like Louisiana Governor Huey Long argued that the New Deal didn’t do enough to redistribute wealth to the nation’s poor. On the other side, Roosevelt’s opponents on the US Supreme Court worked to overturn several New Deal policies, including provisions of the newly created Social Security program. These individual challenges reflect larger social divisions of the time over how the Depression’s fallout should be addressed.)
More than any conflict since the American Revolution, World War II imbued the nation with feelings of social responsibility and civic duty—even those who didn’t fight on the battlefield did their part on the “homefront” to support the nation as a whole. This involved creating many social and community organizations, both locally and the national scale, to coordinate individual and neighborhood activities, such as collecting scrap metal and rubber, rationing supplies, and providing support for those who lost family members. Once the war was over, this sense of interpersonal camaraderie endured, defining the outlook of everyone who lived through it.
(Shortform note: World War II had other social impacts in the US beyond causing community organizations to flourish. For instance, the war brought women into the workforce to fill positions left vacant by men fighting overseas—positions that many didn’t want to leave once the war was over. Another change was that the war created economic and social mobility for African Americans. When the US curtailed racial discrimination in the war effort, African Americans were able to distinguish themselves through military service and on the home front, where they were able to find better work than before, breaking racial barriers in many industries.)
Putnam writes that the generations that followed had no such uniting force. Instead, the defining historical events of the following decades were more divisive, such as the Vietnam War and the Civil Rights Movement. While Americans united in support of these and other causes, many of their neighbors united in opposition, and though the social structures and organizations created during the prior decades persisted, their membership waned and steadily aged as younger generations turned inward with a focus on individual growth and success. Our modern era has experienced a much-needed growth of equality and opportunity, not to mention many technological marvels, but we’ve also lost our sense of common purpose.
(Shortform note: By focusing on the social divisions of the 1950s and ’60s, Putnam may be glossing over the divides of the previous decades. In A People’s History of the United States, Howard Zinn depicts these earlier divisions as a conflict between workers and wealthy elites. For instance, while the early 20th century’s labor movements brought people together for a common cause, they did so in defiance of traditional socioeconomic institutions. Likewise, public support for the World Wars was mixed—there was strong anti-war sentiment as well. While Zinn agrees with Putnam that the US public supported fighting in World War II, he writes that this was only true after the interests and sovereignty of American elites were threatened.)
What Can We Do?
No matter how strongly some people might wish it, the US can’t return to the structures of the past. Instead, Putnam advocates a new wave of community-building efforts, creating new social structures for the 21st century that will restore and replenish our social capital in ways that acknowledge and make use of the progress we’ve made since the end of World War II. Putnam doesn’t presume to offer definitive solutions to our loss of social connection, but he suggests what sectors of society will have to be involved in addressing the problem.
(Shortform note: While Putnam keeps his focus firmly on the US, it may be that future social challenges and solutions will take place on a larger scale. In 21 Lessons for the 21st Century, Yuval Noah Harari argues that all humans are part of a global civilization that has connected the world economically, socially, and technologically. Therefore, Harari rejects nationalistic solutions to global problems such as the threat of war, environmental harm, and the ways in which modern technology is disrupting the sociopolitical landscape. These problems can’t be solved by any one nation, so Harari suggests that the communities and social institutions of the future must embrace the idea that the human race is a global entity.)
First, Putnam argues that change must start in school so that new generations can learn communal responsibility similar to that held by their great-grandparents. This would require drastic improvements to the current state of civics education, but it would also include providing students with ways to actively make a difference in their communities. He suggests that involving students in generating ideas for such programs would instill civic values even more strongly. At the time of writing (the late 1990s), Putnam noted an increase in young people volunteering for public causes that might reflect just such an upward trend.
(Shortform note: Civics education remains enough of an issue that in Battlegrounds, Gen. H.R. McMaster describes it as a matter of national security. He says that for the US to compete in the modern world, Americans young and old need to relearn how democracy works and how to engage in civil discussion. McMaster writes that by reengaging with the democratic process and American pluralism, divisions of race and culture can bolster society instead of weakening it. Putnam and McMaster aren’t alone—other educators and policy institutes have called for an increased emphasis on civics and public involvement in American education.)
Putnam also points out that churches remain some of the country’s strongest social capital creators and must therefore play a role in reforging social bonds. However, he admits that churches tend to focus on uniting people under one religious roof rather than connecting across the aisles of different faiths. If we’re to find a positive way to restore religious communities, Putnam writes that it will have to take a form that’s inclusive and tolerant of religious differences.
(Shortform note: An alternative to Putnam’s suggestion of revitalizing church congregations is to recreate the community-building aspects of organized religion in a secular setting. Groups such as Sunday Assembly are trying to fill that gap by holding gatherings similar to church services without any reference to supernatural beliefs. Sunday Assembly and other organizations, such as the Oasis Network, the Freethought Society, and Black Nonbelievers offer the growing non-religious population a way to build social capital outside of faith-based communities.)
Planning for the Future
Since suburban life plays such a large role in inhibiting social capital’s growth, Putnam says that city designers and urban planners need to build neighborhoods that increase social interactions while reducing commute times. Some such efforts were already underway at the time of Bowling Alone’s publication, but it was too soon for Putnam to draw any conclusions about their efficacy. Acknowledging the role that public policy plays in guiding urban and suburban development, he suggests that this task falls partly under the government’s purview.
(Shortform note: Restoring social capital isn’t the only problem facing 21st century urban planners—they must also deal with climate change, population growth, and traffic congestion. However, some of the proposed solutions could deal with several issues at once. For example, initiatives to reverse the urban “heat island” effect by introducing more parks and vegetation has the added benefit of creating more spaces for people to gather. Likewise, the boom of urban “live-work-play” housing addresses sustainability issues by placing many of the amenities people need in a central location adjacent to their home—which can also solve Putnam’s issue of how suburbs hinder community-building by physically distancing all of life’s activities.)
Lastly, Putnam writes that any solutions to restoring social capital in the 21st century must involve the internet. As stated earlier, when writing in 2000, the social uses of the internet remained unclear, and when updating the book for 2020, Putnam observed that online networks are most effective at creating social capital when they’re used as a binding supplement to traditional networks in the real world. As we move into the future, Putnam suggests that we can choose to use the internet in this way—not as a substitute for in-person interactions, but to build non-virtual communities that extend beyond the internet’s borders.
The Antisocial Network
Though people once hoped the internet would be a uniting influence on society, many now believe that it divides by creating online echo chambers where people only receive information tailored to their pre-existing beliefs. This is made worse by governments and groups that actively use the internet to spread misinformation. For online platforms to build social capital in the way that Putnam suggests, they would have to redesign their algorithms to promote positive interactions between people with different beliefs, reduce their emphasis on anger-provoking content, and clearly label content that misrepresents social divisions.
While social media platforms may not ever do this, people can escape their social media bubbles by educating themselves on how algorithms work and deliberately choosing to step around them. This means not clicking on recommended links, actively searching for opposing viewpoints, and letting platforms access as little of your private information as possible. Many internet users, especially among younger generations, are leaving social media behind because of its negative impact on their lives. This can be difficult—people who leave social media often feel lonely and left-out at first, but those who bear with it find more time for the real-world connections that Putnam says are vital for society as a whole.
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