PDF Summary:American Prometheus, by Kai Bird and Martin Sherwin

According to writers Kai Bird and Martin Sherwin, scientist J. Robert Oppenheimer represents a modern-day Prometheus, the Greek Titan eternally punished for stealing fire from the gods and imparting it to humanity. In American Prometheus, Bird and Sherwin provide a comprehensive biography of Oppenheimer, a historical figure best known for developing the atomic bomb. And although Bird and Sherwin focus on Oppenheimer’s work on the bomb, they also shed light on his personal life, detailing his evolution from adolescent activist to eventual political martyr.

In this guide, we’ll examine Oppenheimer’s life before the bomb, his role in developing the atomic bomb at the Manhattan Project, and the politically motivated security hearing that saw him lose his security clearance in 1954. To conclude, we’ll touch on Oppenheimer’s transformation post-hearing, detailing his exile from the upper ranks of US government. Throughout this guide, we’ll also present further historical context for key events and assess the contemporary impact of Oppenheimer’s work.

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As Wilson and others present at the Manhattan Project meeting conveyed, Oppenheimer’s speech convinced his fellow scientists to complete development of the atomic bomb. Several months later, on July 16, 1945—about three months after Hitler committed suicide and Germany surrendered—a successful test of the atomic bomb, known as Trinity, took place with the Manhattan Project’s scientists watching.

(Shortform note: Though the Trinity test was the world’s largest manmade explosion to date, with a yield of 15,000 to 20,000 tons of TNT, it pales in comparison to the nuclear weapons developed later. For comparison, Russia’s Tsar Bomba (a hydrogen bomb detonated in 1961) had a yield of 50 million tons of TNT, making its explosion some 2,500 times stronger than the first atomic bomb.)

Oppenheimer’s Views on Bombing Japan

Bird and Sherwin relate that, even before Trinity displayed the atomic bomb’s might, the US military was considering using the bombs on Japan, the final Axis power standing in World War II. Moreover, they note that Oppenheimer actively supported the decision to use the atomic bomb against Japan and even acquiesced to the military’s proposed targeting of civilians.

The clearest statement of Oppenheimer’s views, they write, stems from the Scientific Panel’s June 1945 memorandum to the Interim Committee (a military group advising the secretary of war). In this memorandum, Oppenheimer explicitly endorsed military use of the bomb against Japan. He reasoned that one decisive bombing of Japan could serve as an effective deterrent against all future wars, thus justifying the bombing.

Oppenheimer’s Consequentialist Argument and the Ethics of War

Although Oppenheimer’s argument for bombing Japan may seem questionable, it has some basis in ethical philosophy. His argument depends upon the notion that the end (deterring all future wars) justifies the means (bombing innocent citizens). In ethics, this principle corresponds to consequentialism, the theory that actions are made right or wrong by their consequences alone. So, for example, lying to your spouse might be morally permissible if it makes them happier than telling them the truth.

But applying consequentialist theories to wartime ethics can lead to unappealing conclusions. For example, some philosophers have pointed out that, if torturing innocent children of enemy terrorists would provide information on terrorists’ whereabouts and save lives, then consequentialist theories must admit it’s morally permissible to torture them. In a similar vein, consequentialist theories allow for the possibility that sexual violence against innocent citizens could be justified, if these acts of violence cause the enemy to surrender more quickly.

Admittedly, some consequentialists aim to avoid these implications by focusing on the consequences of broader rules, rather than specific acts. For example, they might argue that instituting rules against (say) torture and sexual violence in wartime is justified, because these rules have the best consequences in the long run—even if, in individual instances, violating these rules seems to have better consequences. In other words, a consequentialist could argue that a rule against bombing innocent civilians, even to deter future wars, has better consequences than the rule that permits bombing innocent civilians as a deterrent. For this reason, consequentialists could still reject Oppenheimer’s argument for bombing Japanese civilians.

However, Oppenheimer differed from the military when it came to cooperating with foreign powers. Bird and Sherwin point out that, along with his other panel members, Oppenheimer urged transparency with other international powers—including the Soviet Union. He reasoned that secrecy about the US’s nuclear weapons could spark a deadly arms race, and radical candor was the best route to avoiding this arms race.

(Shortform note: Oppenheimer’s proposal for transparency with the Soviet Union was especially radical at the time, since the US remained suspicious toward the Soviets despite fighting alongside them in World War II. In particular, the US government and public were concerned about the Communist Party and Premier Joseph Stalin’s despotic regime, which US politicians viewed as a potential threat post World War II.)

Japan’s Desire to Surrender

Though Oppenheimer supported using the bomb against Japan, he lacked access to crucial information that, Bird and Sherwin suggest, might have changed his mind. In particular, Oppenheimer didn’t know that Japan was on the verge of surrendering, assuming agreeable terms of surrender could be reached.

Bird and Sherwin note that this fact is now well-known by historians: By May 1945, the US military had intercepted messages from Japan that expressed a desire to surrender on fair terms. For this reason, high-ranking military officials in Washington were actively discussing ways to induce a Japanese surrender. In July 1945, President Truman even acknowledged in his private journal that, according to US intelligence, Japan was actively seeking peace with the Allied forces.

(Shortform note: The lack of public awareness about Japan’s explicit desire to surrender might explain why such a large proportion of the US public approved of the decision to bomb Japan—in 1945, just after the bombing, 85% of Americans surveyed responded that they supported the decision to bomb Japan. However, this support dropped over time, with only 57% of Americans in 2005 responding that they approved of the decision in hindsight.)

The Aftermath of the Atom Bomb

Despite intelligence about Japan’s desire to surrender, President Truman chose to use the atomic bomb on Japan, bombing Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, and Nagasaki on August 9. According to Bird and Sherwin, Oppenheimer’s initial reaction to the bombings was ambivalent; he proudly congratulated his team following the first bombing, but friends report him consumed with qualms. In turn, Oppenheimer became an increasingly outspoken advocate for nuclear regulation after the bombing, earning him powerful political opponents who sought to excommunicate him.

(Shortform note: To date, the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki represent the only wartime uses of nuclear weapons. Since then, the closest the world has come to using nuclear weapons in combat was arguably in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, in which the US and the Soviet Union nearly engaged in nuclear warfare at the peak of the Cold War.)

In this section, we’ll dig deeper into Oppenheimer’s life in the wake of the bombing. Bird and Sherwin suggest that this phase of Oppenheimer’s life was marked by his consistent advocacy for transparency and regulation in nuclear policy, followed by a politically motivated hearing that ended in Oppenheimer’s security clearance being revoked, effectively ousting him from the upper echelon of US government.

Advocacy for Transparency and International Regulation

Following the bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Oppenheimer became increasingly vocal about atomic policy. As Bird and Sherwin relate, Oppenheimer’s proposed nuclear policy had two primary recommendations: The world should create an international commission to regulate nuclear weapons and scientists from all countries should speak freely with one another.

Bird and Sherwin write that Oppenheimer endorsed international regulation of nuclear energy in the Acheson-Lilienthal report to President Truman, a report written on behalf of Truman’s nuclear advisory committee in 1946. As the report’s author, Oppenheimer argued that all countries should submit to an international authority. He reasoned that an international body provided the best chance of avoiding nuclear war, as it would prohibit rogue nations from developing further nuclear weapons on their own.

Meanwhile, Bird and Sherwin say, in a November 1945 speech to Los Alamos scientists, Oppenheimer proposed creating a system that would allow different countries’ scientists to communicate openly. Such a system, he believed, would prevent countries from harboring secrets that could encourage a deadly nuclear arms race.

(Shortform note: Oppenheimer’s vision of an international body regulating atomic weapons was realized 11 years later, in 1957, with the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). While the IAEA has many responsibilities, today, most of those responsibilities center around the enforcement of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, an international agreement that encourages disarmament of nuclear weapons. Moreover, although no concrete system exists to encourage scientists of different countries to communicate, the IAEA also seeks to promote free exchange between member countries regarding the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.)

Oppenheimer’s Unsuccessful Attempts to Influence Nuclear Policy

Although Oppenheimer became an outspoken advocate of nuclear regulation, Bird and Sherwin maintain that he failed to successfully influence US nuclear policy. These failures were most obvious in two instances: Oppenheimer’s meeting with Truman, and the Baruch Plan formed in response to Oppenheimer’s recommendations in the Acheson-Lilienthal Report.

Oppenheimer’s Meeting With Truman

Bird and Sherwin relate that, in October 1945, Oppenheimer earned a meeting with President Truman, providing him the opportunity to express his concerns about a potential arms race with the Soviet Union. However, Oppenheimer didn’t take full advantage of this opportunity, instead regretfully telling Truman “I feel I have blood on my hands”—a statement Truman took as a sign of weakness. Later, Truman allegedly commented that “I don’t want to see that son-of-a-bitch in this office ever again.”

(Shortform note: In Christopher Nolan’s blockbuster film, Oppenheimer, Nolan presents a slightly dramatized version of this meeting—in the movie, after President Truman ends the meeting, Oppenheimer hears Truman call him a “cry-baby scientist” to his aide. But, according to Bird and Sherwin, this detail was an embellishment. Truman did call Oppenheimer a cry-baby scientist, but only in a letter to Dean Acheson written months later.)

The Baruch Plan and the Acheson-Lilienthal Report

Bird and Sherwin also note that, as mentioned above, Oppenheimer was a key author of the Acheson-Lilienthal Report directed to President Truman. This sweeping report recommended full transparency with other nations and developing an international committee that reduced individual nations’ freedom to create nuclear weapons.

But, as Bird and Sherwin relate, President Truman’s representative to the United Nations (UN), Bernard Baruch, gutted the proposal. Instead, Baruch submitted his own plan to the UN that, according to Bird and Sherwin, specifically targeted the Soviet Union by rescinding their veto powers and stipulating that any violation of the agreement be punished with a nuclear bombing. In turn, the Soviets rejected Baruch’s plan, ultimately causing UN talks to stall and setting the stage for the coming Cold War.

(Shortform note: In the wake of the Baruch Plan’s failure, an arms race began that saw the US and the Soviet Union develop massive nuclear arsenals. Indeed, by 1975 the US and the Soviet Union together possessed 47,000 nuclear weapons, of which 27,000 belonged to the US and 20,000 to the Soviet Union. And even though both nations have disarmed significantly, the legacy of the arms race is noticeable today, with Russia and the US each having over 5,000 nuclear weapons in their arsenal—together almost 90% of the world’s nuclear weapons.)

The 1954 Security Clearance Hearing

Though Oppenheimer had spearheaded the creation of the atomic bomb and served on various committees consulting the government on nuclear policy, he was often targeted by his political enemies after the atomic bomb for his past connections to communism. According to Bird and Sherwin, the animosity toward Oppenheimer culminated in December 1953, when he learned that the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) intended to revoke his security clearance.

The movement to revoke Oppenheimer’s security clearance, Bird and Sherwin argue, was led by Lewis Strauss—the chairman of the AEC. Bird and Sherwin write that Strauss’s disdain of Oppenheimer was deep-seated; in his 1949 testimony before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Oppenheimer had embarrassed Strauss by sharply refuting Strauss’s testimony about the importance of isotopes in developing nuclear weapons.

(Shortform note: Though historians generally agree that Strauss was responsible for the AEC’s case against Oppenheimer, Harold Green—one of the AEC’s legal advisers in 1954, who resigned because the AEC mishandled the Oppenheimer hearing—claims that the case didn’t occur because of Strauss’s personal vendetta alone. Rather, he argues that Eisenhower’s 1953 directive, which ordered the AEC to place a “blank wall” between Oppenheimer and confidential information, spurred on the hearing. Strauss, he claims, would have likely preferred a subtler attempt to discredit Oppenheimer, rather than such a blatantly prejudiced hearing.)

After many confrontations with Oppenheimer about nuclear policy in the early 1950s, Strauss began plotting to get Oppenheimer’s security clearance revoked. According to Bird and Sherwin, he first contacted William Borden, the AEC’s staff director who felt similarly about Oppenheimer and provided Borden access to Oppenheimer’s security file. On the basis of this file, Strauss helped Borden compose a brief alleging Oppenheimer was likely a Soviet agent. Bird and Sherwin say that this brief led to an FBI report that convinced the Eisenhower administration to conduct an AEC hearing to revoke Oppenheimer’s security clearance.

(Shortform note: Borden’s legacy was permanently marred by his role in instigating the Oppenheimer hearing—according to President Kennedy’s national security adviser, McGeorge Bundy, Borden was even prevented from joining the Kennedy administration because of his defamatory letter against Oppenheimer.)

Strauss’s Illicit Tactics Throughout the Hearing

As the AEC’s chairman, Strauss had the authority to decide the three members of the AEC panel that would judge Oppenheimer. In addition to this authority, Bird and Sherwin argue, Strauss consistently employed illicit tactics throughout the hearing to predetermine the verdict against Oppenheimer.

Tactic #1: Biasing the Board

First, Bird and Sherwin point out that even before the hearing, Strauss actively biased the panel against Oppenheimer. They write that Strauss arranged for the panel members to read Oppenheimer’s FBI security file before the hearing—in the presence of prosecuting attorney Roger Robb, at that. Without Oppenheimer’s defense present, Robb personally guided the board through the most damning portions of Oppenheimer’s security file. As Bird and Sherwin relate, this violated the basic legal principle of tabula rasa—that juries approach trials with a clean slate and no preconceived opinions of the defendant.

(Shortform note: In the US, the notion of tabula rasa often figures heavily into applications of the Sixth Amendment, which guarantees defendants in criminal trials the right to trial by an “impartial jury.” For example, in the 1965 case Turner v. Louisiana, the US Supreme Court ruled that verdicts in criminal trials must be based exclusively on evidence presented in trial, rather than on the jury’s preconceived beliefs about the defendant. However, because Oppenheimer’s case was a security hearing, not a criminal trial, the requirement of tabula rasa didn’t apply.)

Tactic #2: Handicapping Oppenheimer’s Lawyers

Further, Bird and Sherwin observe that Strauss handicapped Oppenheimer’s lawyers by denying them a security clearance while providing one for the prosecuting lawyers. As a result, Oppenheimer’s lawyers often lacked access to the evidence presented to the panel, making it impossible for them to respond to the prosecution’s accusations.

(Shortform note: This hampering of Oppenheimer’s lawyers would not have occurred in a US criminal or civil case, in which all lawyers have the right to discovery—the process by which the prosecution and defense must exchange all evidence they intend to present, to avoid ambushes in the courtroom and provide ample time to assess the evidence.)

Tactic #3: Illegal FBI Wiretaps

Finally, Bird and Sherwin write that Strauss had access to illegal FBI wiretaps of Oppenheimer’s conversations with his lawyers. As a result, Strauss could predict the defense lawyers’ legal tactics and relay them to Robb, the prosecuting attorney. These illegal wiretaps not only violated attorney-client privilege but also provided Robb a strategic edge throughout the hearing.

(Shortform note: FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, who authorized the illegal wiretaps on Oppenheimer, was often suspected of illegally obtaining information about Americans he thought had communist associations. Notoriously, because he believed the Civil Rights Movement was infiltrated by communists, Hoover authorized illegal wiretaps of Martin Luther King Jr.’s home until 1965, and he also wiretapped the home of King’s lawyer, Stanley David Levison.)

The Presentation of the Chevalier Incident

Bird and Sherwin contend that, in addition to underhanded tricks, the prosecution relied heavily on Oppenheimer’s testimony about the “Chevalier incident,” a conversation between Oppenheimer and Haakon Chevalier, his close friend and fellow Berkeley faculty member, in late 1942.

Months later, in August 1943, Oppenheimer first gave an account of this conversation to Colonel Boris Pash. Oppenheimer told Pash that he and two other scientists had been approached by an intermediary (later revealed as Chevalier) who was friends with George Eltenton, a physicist with connections to the Soviet Union. Per Oppenheimer’s testimony, this intermediary told Oppenheimer and the other scientists that Eltenton hoped to relay information about the Manhattan Project to the Soviets, a suggestion Oppenheimer immediately called treasonous.

(Shortform note: According to historian Vincent C. Jones, although Pash was shocked that Oppenheimer had waited so long to disclose the conversation with Chevalier, he nonetheless believed that Oppenheimer was loyal to the US. For this reason, Pash recommended that Oppenheimer continue directing the Manhattan Project, with the caveat that Oppenheimer be monitored by US intelligence agents.)

Later, in June 1946, FBI agents simultaneously interviewed Eltenton and Chevalier about Chevalier’s discussion with Oppenheimer in 1943, giving them no time to coordinate their answers. They both corroborated Oppenheimer’s previous account, with one glaring exception: They both denied having approached two other scientists, as Oppenheimer claimed. Later, in September 1946, FBI agents interviewed Oppenheimer himself, who admitted to fabricating elements of his original account to protect Chevalier’s identity.

(Shortform note: Though Oppenheimer allegedly attempted to protect Chevalier, Chevalier later became a victim of the US anti-communist movement nonetheless; Chevalier lost his job at Berkeley in 1950 because of his communist sympathies, and he would ultimately leave the US to live in France until his death in 1985.)

Bird and Sherwin point out that, in the 1954 hearing, Oppenheimer’s prior false testimony proved damning. Robb compelled Oppenheimer to admit to the AEC’s panel that he had lied to the FBI and waited eight months to disclose a conversation of crucial security information. Moreover, in the heat of the examination, Robb induced Oppenheimer to call himself “an idiot” who told “a whole fabrication and tissue of lies.” This testimony, Bird and Sherwin argue, greatly discredited Oppenheimer in the eyes of the panel.

(Shortform note: According to Harold Green, the AEC’s legal adviser during the hearing, Robb’s cross-examination represented a key shift in the nature of AEC security hearings. He alleges that, prior to the Oppenheimer hearing, AEC hearings functioned largely to clear individuals accused of being a security risk. Robb’s harsh cross-examinations and entrapment tactics, however, showed that this hearing sought instead to prosecute and humiliate its defendant.)

The AEC Panel’s Ruling

Strauss’s efforts to revoke Oppenheimer’s security clearance proved successful in May 1954: The panel voted two to one to revoke Oppenheimer’s security clearance, deeming Oppenheimer a security risk (though affirming his loyalty to the US). Bird and Sherwin argue that the dissent, written by Ward Evans, captured the true nature of the hearing: It pointed out that nearly all the evidence in the hearing was known in 1947, when Oppenheimer’s security clearance was renewed by the AEC. For this reason, Evans thought there was no justification for revoking Oppenheimer’s clearance years later. And although the ruling was technically a recommendation, Bird and Sherwin note that it was ratified by AEC commissioners in a four-to-one vote in June 1954.

(Shortform note: The panel’s two-to-one ruling represents another key difference between the AEC’s security hearings and US criminal trials, which require juries to deliver a unanimous verdict. Similarly, civil trials normally require unanimous verdicts, though exceptions exist when the prosecution and the defense agree to allow nonunanimous verdicts. So, by permitting nonunanimous rulings, the AEC’s hearing made it easier to rule against Oppenheimer.)

Oppenheimer’s Life Post-Hearing

Bird and Sherwin contend that the loss of Oppenheimer’s security clearance signified his fall from grace in the eyes of politicians and much of the American public. They argue that Oppenheimer effectively underwent a transformation after the security hearing: He was no longer an inside adviser on nuclear policy, but instead an exiled intellectual. In this section, we’ll discuss Bird and Sherwin’s account of this transition followed by Oppenheimer’s later political rehabilitation by the Kennedy administration.

The Shift from Political Insider to Public Intellectual

According to Bird and Sherwin, Oppenheimer’s public activism became increasingly selective in the years following his security hearing. They argue that he became reticent to speak about nuclear policy, and instead spoke more generally on the interaction between science and culture.

For example, Bird and Sherwin point to Oppenheimer’s reaction to President Eisenhower’s nuclear policies. According to Oppenheimer’s friend David Lilienthal (a coauthor of the Acheson-Lilienthal Report), Oppenheimer refused to sign petitions advising the US to avoid preemptive nuclear conflict with Communist China in 1955. Though Oppenheimer allegedly agreed with the petition’s sentiment, he thought it unwise to imply the US government needed outside advising on nuclear policy. Bird and Sherwin argue that this instance reveals that, post-hearing, Oppenheimer wanted to appear patriotic and give no fuel to his critics.

(Shortform note: Eisenhower’s “New Look” policy laid out his stance toward nuclear weapons during the Cold War with the Soviet Union. He proposed stockpiling nuclear weapons to deter the Soviets (and other communist nations) from declaring war against the US, a proposal that resulted in an exponentially larger US nuclear arsenal.)

However, the authors point out that regarding other topics, Oppenheimer spoke freely. One year after the hearing, for instance, Oppenheimer published eight essays urging scientists to be transparent with the public. These publications, Bird and Sherwin maintain, show that Oppenheimer remained keenly concerned about broader cultural issues, though he balanced this concern with his wish to appear a faithful American.

(Shortform note: Though Oppenheimer’s desire to appear patriotic may have been caused by the security hearing, it also reflected a broader trend in the US known as the “Red Scare.” During the Red Scare in the 1950s, the American public and politicians became increasingly concerned about communism pervading American society. Consequently, American citizens sought to make their patriotic commitments clear to avoid arousing suspicion of having communist sympathies.)

Oppenheimer’s Political Rehabilitation

Bird and Sherwin further argue that, although Oppenheimer never regained his security clearance, the Kennedy Administration rehabilitated his political image by awarding him the prestigious Enrico Fermi Prize for public service. According to Bird and Sherwin, this 1963 award was highly symbolic: It represented Democrats’ belief that Oppenheimer was the victim of Republicans’ politically charged attacks the previous decade. And though Oppenheimer remained a divisive political figure, the award signified a shift in his favor just four years before his death.

(Shortform note: While the Kennedy Administration began to rehabilitate Oppenheimer’s image, the Biden administration went a step further in 2022—it retroactively reversed the AEC’s decision to revoke Oppenheimer’s security clearance, indicating that the AEC’s original decision was little more than a politically motivated scheme. In his interview with The New York Times, American Prometheus coauthor Kai Bird praised this decision by the Biden administration, calling the AEC’s original decision a “black mark on the honor of the nation.”)