In this episode of the Shawn Ryan Show, former Wagner Group commander Marat Gabidullin discusses the private military organization's history and operations. The discussion covers the group's formation in 2014 by Evgeny Prigozhin and its initial involvement in eastern Ukraine, as well as its subsequent expansion into Syria, where Wagner forces engaged in significant battles, including a confrontation with U.S. Special Forces at Khasham.
The episode explores Wagner Group's evolution from a military contractor to a complex organization with independent ventures in Africa, including mining operations and industrial projects. Gabidullin details the growing tensions between Wagner's leadership and the Russian military establishment, which culminated in Prigozhin's 2023 attempted coup and eventual downfall, marking a significant shift in Russian security dynamics.
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The Wagner Group, founded in 2014 during the eastern Ukraine war, was created by Evgeny Prigozhin, a former criminal who built connections with the Kremlin through his military catering business. Prigozhin partnered with Dmitry Utkin, a former GRU officer who became the group's commander, initially forming a core team of about 50 military contractors with experience in Syria.
The Kremlin used the Wagner Group as a deniable force to support separatists in Ukraine while avoiding international sanctions. The group attracted former military personnel with promises of adventure, camaraderie, and attractive pay of around $2,000 monthly.
In 2015, the Wagner Group deployed to Syria, initially struggling until Russia's intervention expanded. The group played a crucial role in capturing Palmyra from ISIS, which allowed Prigozhin to expand Wagner's capabilities and demonstrate its value to the Russian government.
A significant turning point came during the Battle of Khasham, where Wagner forces faced U.S. Special Forces and Kurdish fighters. According to Marat Gabidullin, the battle resulted in significant Wagner casualties when they attempted to seize the Conoco plant. American forces, using substantial air power, successfully defended their position, resulting in 23 Wagner mercenaries killed and 28 wounded in Gabidullin's unit alone.
Following Syria, the Wagner Group expanded into Africa, particularly Sudan and the Central African Republic. John Lechner explains that Prigozhin independently pursued mining concessions and industrial ventures like breweries, extending Wagner's influence beyond the Kremlin's priorities. After Prigozhin's death, the Russian government struggled to integrate and control these African operations, complicated by the group's previous independence.
Tensions arose between Prigozhin and Russian military officials, particularly Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, due to Wagner's independent funding and operations. These tensions culminated in the 2023 Wagner mutiny, where Prigozhin led forces in an attempted coup, overtaking the southern Russian military command in Rostov. Despite negotiations by Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko to halt the march to Moscow, Prigozhin's actions led to his eventual downfall three months later, fundamentally reshaping Russian security dynamics.
1-Page Summary
The Wagner Group, a name now known globally for its private military endeavors, was founded in 2014 during the eastern Ukraine war by Evgeny Prigozhin, a figure with a checkered past and close ties to Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Evgeny Prigozhin's origin story reads like a gangster tale turned corporate titan; from a petty thief and gangster jailed at the age of 18, he later emerged as a successful businessman leveraging connections from running restaurants in St. Petersburg. These connections with the Kremlin, formed through military catering contracts, positioned him to raise a private army amidst the chaos of Ukraine's political upheaval. Prigozhin saw an opportunity to further curry favor with Putin when the Ukrainian revolution unfolded and the annexation of Crimea ignited conflict in eastern Ukraine. He allied with Dmitry Utkin, a former GRU officer who went on to become the main commander of the Wagner Group, to provide privatized military support to the separatists.
The Wagner Group's core was initially formed by about 50 contractors with military background, mainly from a private military company (PMC) in Syria. These individuals, along with Dmitry Utkin, whose call sign 'Wagner' would christen the group, possessed the tactical knowledge and experience necessary for covert operations. Prigozhin, wielding his Kremlin access and financial resources, sealed a deal with Utkin to combine their respective strengths and form this deniable force.
The Wagner Group became the Kremlin's deniable force, with the Russian government aiming to support the anti-Maidan protesters and separatists in eastern Ukraine without risking international sanctions or further isolation.
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The History and Formation of the Wagner Group
The Wagner Group, utilized by the Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) to support separatists, was one of the forces employed during Russia's maneuvers to influence ceasefire negotiations and take control over separatist republics. Marat Gabidullin arrived in Syria in April 2015, around the time when Russia overtly intervened with a full air campaign. Initially, Wagner forces in Syria, comprising about 50 guys, including Marat, struggled as the Russian military did not utilize them effectively, resulting in casualties and retreat.
However, the scale of their involvement shifted when Russian air-power proved insufficient to defeat Assad's opposition and ISIS. Prigozhin and Utkin ensured Wagner forces were reintroduced in Syria, participating in the capture of Palmyra from ISIS and allowing Prigozhin to expand Wagner's size, capabilities, and showcase its value to the Russian government. The use of Wagner mercenaries enabled the Russian military to maintain the appearance of a war with little bloodshed as they did not have to report casualties within the mercenary group.
Marat Gabidullin provides an in-depth account of the Battle of Khasham, detailing the heavy casualties suffered by the Wagner Group against U.S. Special Forces and Kurdish fighters. Gabidullin admits that due to indecisive actions and insufficient resources, his force failed to take a factory encompassing infrastructure of an important oil field near Deir Ezzor, Syria. The subsequent engagement led to defeat and casualties for Wagner forces as they were met with overwhelming American air power.
Shawn Ryan teases a discussion about the Battle of Khasham, noting that 500 Wagner Group soldiers were pitted against 40 U.S. Special Forces alongside Kurdish partner forces. The conflict escalated when the Wagner Group tried to seize the valuable Conoco plant near Khasham, which was under control of U.S. and Kurdish forces. Gabidullin explained that the Wagner forces were only 300 meters from the U.S. stronghold, ready to attack, but were prevented by a powerful American counteroffensive.
During the assault, the American forces utilized significant air power, including Apaches, combat drones, and two Spectre gunships, to suppress the attack. The U.S. had contacted the Russian Ministry of Defense to confirm if the attacking force was Russian-backed; however, despite denials from the ministry, the battle continued, resulting in the destruction of two of Wagner's assault units and aroun ...
The Wagner Group's Military Operations, Particularly in Syria
The Wagner Group, following its entanglements in the conflicts in Syria and Ukraine, has set its sights on new opportunities across Africa, with Prigozhin's untimely death complicating its relation to the Russian government.
With the de-escalation of Syrian conflict, the Wagner Group has been proactive in asserting its presence in Africa.
Former member Marat Gabidullin observed the group's expansion in Africa, noting its activities in Sudan and Central African Republic (CAR). In these countries, the Wagner Group signed contracts for training and secured mining concessions, further extending their reach without direct Russian competition. Not only has the group delved into training but also into industrial ventures such as running breweries and pursuing gold mining operations. These actions suggest Wagner's independent pursuit of profit and influence outside the Kremlin's slated areas of interest.
John Lechner explains that Prigozhin, presented to the Kremlin an opportunity for Russia to extend its global presence through potentially lucrative business ventures that would also finance Wagner operations. By exploiting the Kremlin's disinterest in certain African regions, Prigozhin independently financed Wagner operations and expanded the group's sway beyond Russian geopolitical objectives.
The expansion and independent ventures of the Wagner Group in Africa have introduced new challenges for the Russian government in terms of control and resource conflicts.
The complexity of integrating the Wagner Group's African commercial interests has led to resource and control disputes. Foll ...
Wagner Group's Expansion Into Africa and Independent Ventures
John Lechner delves into the intricate conflict between Evgeny Prigozhin, who leads the Wagner Group, and Russian government authorities, detailing a narrative of tension, aspirations, and a power struggle within Russia's security dynamics.
Lechner paints a picture of the Wagner Group as it relates to Russian government operations, where Prigozhin straddles both the ambitions of the Kremlin and his private profit-driven ventures. Prigozhin's direct access to Putin and independent actions have made him a source of irritation for military officials, including those in the general staff and the Ministry of Defense led by Minister Sergei Shoigu.
The struggle for control is partly fueled by financial interests, with Prigozhin's funding mechanisms for the Wagner Group bypassing the Ministry of Defense and thereby depriving Minister Shoigu of the opportunity to benefit financially, which further escalates the tension.
Prigozhin's ambition and high-risk tolerance, evidenced by his approach in the Battle of Khasham against American forces, has historically been a catalyst for creating tension with the Russian military establishment. His audacity is both a means for outmaneuvering rivals within the Russian hierarchy and exacerbating already strained relations.
In 2023, Wagner forces, under Prigozhin's command, moved from Ukraine to southern Russia with an apparent goal of capturing and executing Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu. This culminated in an attempted coup on June 23, 2023, when Wagner forces overtook the southern Russian military command in Rostov. Shoigu, however, evaded arrest. This act underscored a profound rift with the Russian military establishment and highlighted Prigozhin's grave miscalculation in assuming that Putin would support him over S ...
Conflict Between Wagner Group and Russian Government
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