#134 John Gentry - Unpacking the Information War Against the U.S.

The podcast anchored by John Gentry delves into the extensive history of Soviet propaganda and influence operations, emphasizing its systematic approach and long-term impact, especially in educational institutions.

The Soviet Union systematically developed propaganda and disinformation tactics in the early 20th century, creating "innocence clubs" and using front organizations to covertly spread their messaging.

John Gentry outlines the strategic foundation of Soviet propaganda initiated in the early 20th century. He notes how Lenin and Stalin categorized individuals to structure propaganda and recruitment efforts effectively. The term "party people" was used for those working directly for the Soviet government or affiliated communist parties. "Fellow travelers" referred to sympathizers not fully committed to the party, while "naive dupes" described those unknowingly serving the objectives of more informed communists.

The Soviets established the Comintern (Communist International) to coordinate global communist propaganda, which disbanded in 1943 due to Allied pressures but passed its mission of subversion to Soviet intelligence. Subsequently, the KGB took on the mantle of spreading disinformation with "active measures," such as forged documents and planted stories in foreign media, illustrating their pervasive and deceptive tactics.

The Soviets established the Comintern (Communist International) to coordinate global communist propaganda efforts, which were later taken over by the KGB after the Comintern was disbanded.

Willy Munsenberg was a key figure who organized printing presses and publishing houses to produce material that served Soviet interests. He also established "innocence clubs" disguised as homogenous groups to covertly recruit and manipulate people into promoting Soviet-aligned narratives.

The KGB developed sophisticated "active measures" involving forged documents, planted stories in foreign media, and leveraging sympathetic journalists to amplify their desired narratives.

The KGB further developed information warfare after the Com ...

Gentry elaborates on the contemporary challenges posed by foreign influence operations targeting the United States, highlighting that such activities are not solely for sowing discord but can also undermine support for key US foreign policy positions, such as that on Ukraine.

Different Goals, Diverse Tactics

According to Gentry, countries like Russia and China have adopted sophisticated strategies to manipulate narratives and influence policies in the United States.

The Russians have continued to employ similar information warfare tactics, though with different goals than the Soviets, aiming to divide the U.S. and undermine support for Ukraine.

Russian information operations have taken on a more specified target, aiming to weaken support for NATO and Ukraine and generate divisions within the EU. Gentry asserts that the Russians are targeting conservative audiences in the U.S., in contrast to the previous Soviet focus on liberals.

China has also developed extensive influence operations, utilizing business relationships and its large student population abroad to gather information and shape global narratives.

China's approach to influence differs from the Soviet model; rather than aiming to destroy, China molds the system to serve its interests. This is exemplified by their employment of Chinese students overseas as information gatherers for the Chinese Communist Party. Furthermore, China seeks to reshape international organizations to align with its views.

Iran and North Korea have also been active in conducting cyber-enabled information operations against the U.S.

While not mentioned in detail in the content provided, it is implicit that Iran and North Korea play a role in this new era of information warfare against the United States.

Manipulation and Influence in the Intelligence Community and Media

Gentry discusses how the misuse of intelligence prestige can mislead the public, as seen in the handling of Hunter Biden's laptop incident, where former intelligence officials suggested Russian involvement where it seemed unlikely.

The Russians have targeted conservative and Republican-leaning audiences in the U.S. in recent years, in contrast to the Soviet focus on liberals, in an effort to sow discord and weaken support for NATO and Ukraine.

John Gentry posits that Russia's contemporary information warfare tactics strive to create internal conflicts within the United States, specifically targeting conservatives to disrupt the unity over U.S. foreign policy regarding Ukraine.

China has also developed extensive influence operations, uti ...

The recent collaboration between the intelligence community, media, and political actors raises concerns about the politicization of agencies meant to remain nonpartisan. John Gentry and others discuss the origins and potential consequences of this trend.

During the Obama administration, diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) policies were aggressively implemented in the intelligence community, altering its organizational culture and demographics.

The Obama administration sought to "transform" the federal workforce, including the intelligence agencies, by mandating DEI hiring, promotion, and assignment practices.

John Gentry notes that during the Obama administration, the federal workforce, including intelligence agencies underwent significant changes emphasizing DEI policies. These changes aimed to hire, promote, and assign employees based on demographic groups, potentially leading to the promotion of those aligned with the administration’s agenda and the marginalization of others.

Gentry indicates that President Obama's executive order in August 2011 pushed these practices with the intention of transforming not just the workforce but the country. The Director of National Intelligence, who was granted coordinating power by the 2004 Reform Act, implemented DEI strategies within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the CIA.

This led to the promotion of individuals aligned with the administration's political agenda and the marginalization of those perceived as unsupportive.

Gentry asserts that this emphasis on identity over individual merit aligns with what he describes as cultural Marxism and has shifted away from traditional operations within the federal government and intelligence community.

The Trump administration largely failed to address or reverse these changes, allowing the politicization of the intelligence community to continue and escalate.

Despite warnings from knowledgeable people in the intelligence community about political activism, Gentry notes that Trump's advisors and senior appointees, including acting DNI Dan Coats and Sue Gordon from CIA, did not take significant administrative action to reverse the previous administration's policies.

Gentry expresses concerns about the problematic actions arising from the changing organizational culture within the agencies, where individuals feel compelled to act against what they perceive as "evil," especially during the Trump years. This has exacerbated the politicization and led to a sentiment in which certain individuals perceived Trump as wrong or evil.

Gentrystates that these internal changes have compromised the integrity of intelligence work, leading to instances where intelligence products were allegedly tailored for political reasons. He references a letter by the analytical ombudsman of the ODNI to the Senate Intelligence Committee, which describes the withholding of information from the White House by China analysts due to disagreement with Trump's policies, and Russia analysts from the CIA pushing a narrative about Trump being manipulated by Putin.

Moreover, Gentry and Shawn Ryan discuss leak ...

There is a contentious debate regarding the impact that diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) policies have had on the operational performance of the intelligence community (IC).

There is growing evidence that the DEI policies implemented in the intelligence community have had a detrimental impact on its operational performance and effectiveness.

John Gentry critically discusses DEI policies, suggesting that they are enforced by diversity offices within intelligence agencies and can sometimes lead to the termination of managers who do not adhere to these standards. He claims that there is a significant number of IC members who support DEI on political or ideological grounds or due to material interests, which could affect the IC's operational performance.

The intelligence community leadership has claimed that DEI policies improve operational performance, but independent analysis has found no evidence to support this claim.

Leaders such as Jim Clapper and John Brennan have claimed that DEI policies improve operations within the IC, but Gentry, drawing on his academic research, has published a paper refuting those assertions. He asserts there is no evidence supporting the claim that DEI improves performance and anticipates that forthcoming publications will argue that DEI is substantially damaging to operational performance.

In contrast, there is substantial anecdotal evidence that the DEI policies have created budgetary issues, hiring challenges, and performance problems in the field.

Gentry argues that DEI policies divide the workforce and create internal conflict by establishing employee resource groups focused on demographic identities. He states that these policies have raised accusations of preferential hiring that led to demographic imbalances and operational problems, citing the experiences of individuals who reached out to him confirming his suspicions. Also, the ...