In this episode of Rachel Maddow Presents: Déjà News, the Supreme Court's framework for presidential immunity comes under scrutiny. The discussion centers on the Court's establishment of three tiers of immunity for presidential conduct, as well as the concerns raised by legal experts regarding the Court's broad interpretation of "core functions" and the ambiguity surrounding the "outer perimeter" of official acts.
The blurb explores the implications of the Court's rulings, which include evidence restrictions for proving criminal intent and the challenges of separating intent from actions. Listeners will gain insight into the complex legal landscape surrounding presidential immunity and its potential impact on accountability.
Sign up for Shortform to access the whole episode summary along with additional materials like counterarguments and context.
The Supreme Court has laid out a framework establishing three levels of immunity for presidential conduct:
Actions that directly execute the president's constitutional duties are absolutely immune from prosecution, according to the Court majority.
For official acts outside core functions, the president has a presumption of immunity that can be overcome if prosecution wouldn't impair executive functioning. As Morrison explains, this immunity tier is more assailable than absolute immunity.
The Court grants no immunity for the president's unofficial, personal conduct divorced from official duties.
Critically, the majority defined the president's "core constitutional functions" expansively to include interactions with the Department of Justice (DOJ), even those potentially aimed at subverting laws. As McCord cautions, this suggests a concerning breadth of immunity for inappropriate White House-DOJ communications.
The line separating presumptively immune "outer perimeter" official acts from non-immune personal acts remains unclear and open to legal debate, according to experts McCord and Weissmann. They note the difficulty in assessing motives when determining if an act falls in this gray area.
The Court ruled that prosecutors cannot use evidence of official acts, however improper the intent, to suggest criminal motivation for unofficial acts. McCord and Weissmann highlight how this separates intent from actions, complicating efforts to connect unofficial wrongdoing to official conduct.
1-Page Summary
The Supreme Court has established a detailed framework for presidential immunity consisting of three types of conduct, each receiving varying degrees of legal shelter.
The Supreme Court majority underscores absolute immunity for actions that fall squarely within the president's core constitutional duties. This tier protects the president completely from legal action regarding decisions and behaviors that are directly connected to executing the responsibilities of the office.
For presidential acts that are considered official but not core functions—the "outer perimeter" of a president's official acts—the Court allows a rebuttable presumption of immunity. This middle ground suggests that the president is generally protected unless the government can show that prosecuting these acts wouldn't impede executive functions. Chief Justice Roberts and other justices imply that this isn't a solid wall of immunity; it's one that government prosecutors may breach if they can prove that a prosecution will not create a separation of powers issue.
For actions deemed personal and unofficial, the Court concedes no immunity, distinguishing clearly between acts arising from the president’s function as an individual citizen versus official conduct. However, guests on the podcast, such as Morrison and McCord, discuss the struggle to distinguish between official and private acts, especially when there's an overlapping nature of evidence between the two spheres.
The interpretation of this framework is critical as the Court has not offered sweeping immunity to the former president that could not be challenged by charges proposed by Jack Smith. The Court's conception of immunity is indeed broader than what some may favor, leaving much for lower courts to interpret on remand. Justice Barrett's concurring opinion also suggests a simpler standard for presidential immunity that may lead to various interpretations in low ...
The Supreme Court's framework for presidential immunity and its three tiers of protection
The court recognized presidential communications, especially those with the attorney general, as "core constitutional functions" that are absolutely immune from criminal prosecution. This broad interpretation suggests that a wide variety of interactions involving the president and the Department of Justice (DOJ), even those with the intent of subverting the law, could be immune from any criminal charges.
The opinion holds that these sorts of communications are part of an unreviewable exercise of the president's official functions to oversee the DOJ and the faithful execution of laws. Morrison conveys that the court views all presidential contacts with DOJ leadership as conduct in the president's official capacity, intimating at a broad conception of "core constitutional functions."
The majority opinion does not concretely outline any conduct as strictly unofficial, which implies a sweeping immunity for presidential dealings with the DOJ. However, Justice Barrett introduces a contrary, narrower viewpoint, emphasizing that distinguishing official from unofficial conduct is feasible, and not all actions, such as arranging alternate slates of electors, are entitled to immunity.
Despite Justice Barrett's stance, the majority did not agree and chose to send the case back to Judge Chutkan for further factual analysis. The majority even suggested that ...
The court's broad interpretation of the president's "core constitutional functions" that are immune from prosecution
There is a significant ambiguity surrounding the concept of "outer perimeter of official acts," particularly when it relates to the President's immunity from certain forms of legal scrutiny, leaving prosecutors and lower courts with the challenge of interpretation without much guidance.
Legal experts Mary McCord and Andrew Weissmann delve into the complexities of discerning the boundary between official and unofficial presidential acts. They discuss the nuanced difficulties that emerge when determining what falls within the scope of the federal or executive authority, which is considered official and therefore immune.
This leaves significant uncertainty for prosecutors and lower courts in determining what conduct falls within the "outer perimeter of official acts" and how readily that presumption of immunity can be overcome. McCord reflects on scenarios, such as discussions of election fraud with state officials, demonstrating the gray areas concerning what may be deemed an official act, notwithstanding the president having no formal role in certain domains.
Weissmann observes that the majority opinion seems to extend the breadth of the president’s official communications, implying a broader interpretation that may encompass a wide range of subject matter. However, Weissmann also notes that due to an inadequate factual record, the case requires a factual hearing to further scrutinize these nuances.
Both experts recognize the difficulty in defining the "outer perimeter" of official acts. Weissmann proposes that an action’s description can skew it to appear within ...
The ambiguity around "outer perimeter of official acts" and how that could be interpreted
The court has established significant limitations concerning the evidence prosecutors can use in proving criminal intent, particularly regarding the activities of a sitting president.
In the latest court ruling, it was determined that prosecutors are broadly prohibited from using evidence of a president's official acts to suggest criminal intent or motivation for any unofficial conduct. This separation of official and unofficial actions presents a major barrier to legal challenges aimed at proving corrupt intent behind a president's actions, even if those actions fall outside the protected sphere of official immunity.
Mary McCord and Andrew Weissmann discuss the nuanced implications of this ruling, highlighting the complexities and potential obstacles it creates for prosecutors. They delve into hypothetical scenarios that underscore the restrictions now in place. For instance, if a call made by a president is deemed an official act and its official designation is not challenged, it cannot be used to infer motive, knowledge, or intent for any unofficial acts related to a scheme to overturn the electorate's decision.
In attempting to clarify these restrictions, they point out the anomalies and contradictions that arise, particularly when dealing with acts of bribery. The majority opinion seems to suggest that while evidence of an official act, such as an ambassadorial appointment, can be introduced, probing into the president's or his advisors' private records or testimony surrounding the official act itself is off-limits. This creates a puzzling scenario where the direct connection between an alleged bribe and the resulting official act cannot be fully examined or pre ...
The court's restrictions on using evidence of official acts to prove criminal intent for unofficial acts
Download the Shortform Chrome extension for your browser