In a bonus episode of "Rachel Maddow Presents: Déjà News," a powerhouse panel including Justices John Roberts, Clarence Thomas, Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kagan, Amy Coney Barrett, Samuel Alito, Ketanji Brown Jackson, Brett Kavanaugh, Neil Gorsuch, and legal experts Jonathan Mitchell, Jason Murray, and Shannon Stevenson delve into the complexities of Section 3 of the 14th Amendment and its implications for former President Trump. The discussion orbits around the crucial question: Could Trump's actions be deemed insurrection, barring him from future federal positions?
The episode weaves through historical context, legal precedents, and contemporary interpretations as speakers debate the meaning of "office under the United States," the enforceability of Section 3, and the states' authority to exclude candidates based on the Electors Clause. Concerns over the potential lack of uniform enforcement across states bring tension to the fore, while the examination of January 6th as a basis for disqualification stirs a clash of opinions. Listen to this insightful conversation as it lays bare the legal intricacies and possible ramifications, capturing a significant moment in the nation's constitutional discourse.
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The debate explores the implications of section 3 of the 14th Amendment on former President Trump's eligibility to hold future federal office. Legal experts are investigating if Mr. Trump's actions qualify as insurrection and thus could disqualify him from federal positions, including the presidency.
Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson notes that "President" and "Vice President" are not explicitly listed in the 14th Amendment's disqualification clause. Jonathan Mitchell and Jason Murray argue whether these roles fall under "office under the United States." Mitchell believes the framers did not intend to include the presidency, referencing a draft of Section 3. Conversely, Murray insists that the term encompasses all who swear an oath to an office, including the President.
Neil Gorsuch differentiates between "office" and "officer," suggesting presidents are not "officers of the United States" as they are elected, not appointed, and therefore do not fall under Section 3. Murray agrees with the distinction but highlights the broad definition within Section 3.
Mitchell suggests, referencing Chief Justice Chase's opinion in Griffin's case, that without Congressional action Section 3 is not self-executing. Gorsuch believes in immediate disqualification under Section 3 without further process, while Murray argues for a necessary procedure to determine disqualification. Furthermore, they discuss whether states can enforce Section 3 independently, referencing Sotomayor's view on the Griffin case and its impact on the Enforcement Act of 1870.
Murray and Mitchell debate states' powers under Article II to choose presidential electors, with Murray supporting state enforcement of Section 3 and Mitchell expressing doubts about the Secretary of State's authority to predict Congressional waivers to admitted insurrectionists. Kavanaugh and Mitchell consider state enforcement of disqualification since Section 3's ratification, concluding there have been no such attempts.
Alito and Mitchell examine historical applications of Section 3 by states. Referring to Griffin's case, they discuss the established understanding that only Congress has the authority to enforce Section 3, shaping the Enforcement Act of 1870.
Chief Justice Roberts and others articulate concerns about inconsistent application of disqualification standards across states. Jason Murray argues for state enforcement as a backup when there is no federal action, while Justice Jackson worries about non-uniformity in presidential elections.
The discussion centers on whether the January 6th events qualify as "insurrection." While Stevenson argues for a clear disqualification for an "avowed insurrectionist," Mitchell contests that the day's events don't meet the criterion for an insurrection. This necessitates an organized and violent attempt to overthrow the government. Conversely, Murray points to Trump's actions suggesting involvement in an insurrection against the Constitution.
In conclusion, the conversation reflects an intricate legal examination concerning the impacts of Section 3 of the 14th Amendment and its relevance to former President Trump's capability to serve in federal office again.
1-Page Summary
The legal discussion centers on the applicability of Section 3 of the 14th Amendment to former President Trump, examining whether his actions can be characterized as insurrection and, consequently, whether they disqualify him from holding future federal office.
Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson contemplates the absence of explicit mention of the "President" or "Vice President" in the list of offices from which one could be barred under Section 3. Jonathan Mitchell and Jason Murray engage in a debate over whether these positions are encompassed by the phrase "office under the United States" with Jonathan Mitchell arguing that the framers did not focus on the presidency while drafting Section 3, but rather on the risk of former Confederates infiltrating state governments and Congress. Mitchell also references a draft of Section 3 that mentioned the presidency, indicating some consideration of it in the framers' discussions.
Neil Gorsuch raises the distinction between "office" and "officer" within the Constitution's context while Jonathan Mitchell asserts that the president and vice president are not "officers of the United States" because they are elected, not appointed, and therefore not covered by Section 3. Jason Murray acknowledges the distinction but emphasizes that, in Section 3, an "officer of the United States" is someone who swears an oath and holds an office, yet cites exceptions like the President pro tempore and the Speaker of the House.
Mitchell argues that based on Chief Justice Chase's opinion in Griffin's case, Section 3 is not self-executing without Congressional legislation. Gorsuch posits that disqualification under Section 3 is immediate and does not require additional procedures, while Murray argues for a procedure to adjudicate disqualification, even if it is considered self-executing.
Debates around Griffin's case reveal differing views on whether states can enforce Section 3 without Congressional authorization, with Sotomayor noting the case is not a presidential decision from the Supreme Court but recognizing its influence on the Enforcement Act of 1870.
Jason Murray argues that states have broad power under Article II to select presidential electors and considers Section 3 in this process, while Jonathan Mitchell counters that no Secretary of State can predict the likelihood of Congress granting a waiver to an admitted insurrectionist. Kavanaugh and Mitchell discuss historical practice since Section 3's ratification, noting no attempts by states to enforce disqualification against federal officers.
Alito and Mitchell delve into the history of states using Section 3 to bar federal officeholders, with Mitchell citing Griffin's case since 1870 as the settled understanding. Kavanaugh alludes to the original public meaning of Section 3, indicating Chase's opinion that only Congress ...
Whether Section 3 of the 14th Amendment Disqualifies Former President Trump from Future Federal Office
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