What is the hard problem of consciousness? What can modern science tell us about how our subjective experiences arise from objective reality?
In The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind, Julian Jaynes explores the complex nature of consciousness beyond simple sensory awareness. He defines consciousness, but his theory (and everyone else’s) can’t explain what gives rise to the subjective experience of consciousness.
Read on to explore theories about what consciousness is, how it evolved, and why philosophers call it “the hard problem.”
The Hard Problem of Consciousness
What is the hard problem of consciousness? Essentially, it’s the fact that consciousness is tricky to define. The word usually refers to a state of being aware of yourself and your existence in the world. Jaynes emphasizes that consciousness is more than simple sensory awareness: It’s the experience of having a “self” who can reflect on and make sense of what you experience. Consciousness involves self-awareness, reflective thought, and an ability to make decisions based on mental processes we experience as internal rather than external. So, instead of being guided by a voice that seems as though it comes from outside of us, we can reflect, reason, and decide based on our thoughts and our interpretations of the world around us.
(Shortform note: Many experts agree with Jaynes that the experience of consciousness involves an awareness of our thoughts, feelings, memories, and sensations. But neuroscientists say their theories can’t yet fully explain what gives rise to that subjective experience of consciousness. In other words, many theories describe the neural conditions associated with consciousness, but they don’t bridge the “explanatory gap” between the physical processes occurring in the brain and the first-person experience of being conscious that we have in our minds. This gap is what makes consciousness so tricky to define [or, in philosophers’ parlance, “a hard problem.”])
| Defining Consciousness Some thinkers would say that before we can even consider the questions Jaynes raises—such as how and when consciousness evolved, and how humans might have experienced life before consciousness—there are even more basic questions to consider. For example, what is consciousness? How do our subjective experiences arise from our objective reality? And is the brain somehow responsible for all of it, or is there something else going on? These questions are so difficult to satisfactorily answer that philosophers such as David Chalmers (The Conscious Mind) refer to consciousness as a “hard problem.” The trouble is that science can’t explain exactly how our conscious experiences come about—so some scientists don’t try. In Putting Ourselves Back in the Equation, George Musser says many experts dodge the problem, either by assuming we have to wait to solve it until neuroscientists come to a more complete understanding of the brain, or by accepting that we can’t explain consciousness and concluding it must arise as some fundamental property of reality. But some experts have tried to explain consciousness, coming up with two main theories. The global neuronal workspace theory argues that consciousness arises when information, such as thoughts or perceptions, is shared across different parts of the brain and becomes available for us to consciously access it, train our attention on it, and hold it in working memory. The integrated information theory, on the other hand, sees consciousness as a fundamental property of complex, interconnected networks such as the brain—something that arises inevitably when so many neurons are working together such that the whole is somehow greater than the sum of its parts. The core of “the hard problem,” Musser explains, is that the qualities of our conscious experience feel “intrinsic”: The subjective qualities of an experience—such as the particular blue hue you see when looking at a blue scarf or the specific pain you feel when pricking your finger with a pin—feel like inherent to those experiences themselves. In other words, it seems as though they’re simply what it’s like to have that experience, independent of the context of the experience or possible comparisons you could make to other kinds of experiences. Some experts—such as philosopher Daniel Dennett in Consciousness Explained—have concluded that consciousness isn’t real at all; rather, it’s an illusion. But others think the qualities of our conscious experience might not be so difficult to explain: Our experience of a color such as blue or a sensation such as pain could arise from webs of learned associations and relationships. It might be possible to learn to see these relational structures, in much the same way that a trained musician can hear the notes that make up a chord. In fact, psychologist Iris Berent argues our trouble understanding consciousness arises from natural biases in our thinking, and how we experience consciousness, rather than from consciousness itself. We view our minds as separate from our bodies (dualism), and we believe things have an innate essence (essentialism). But these biases might not align with reality—which means that the hard problem of consciousness could be more psychological than philosophical. |
