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What shapes human nature? Are we born as blank slates, or do our genes play a role in who we become?

The Blank Slate by Steven Pinker challenges long-held beliefs about human nature. Pinker argues that science shows we’re not blank slates. Instead, we have innate tendencies shaped by our genes. He explores how this view impacts our understanding of personality, morality, and social issues.

Read more for an overview of this book that explores what makes us human.

Overview of The Blank Slate by Steven Pinker

Throughout most of the 20th century, the mainstream intellectual view of human nature was that humans are benevolent blank slates, with immaterial souls distinct from their physical bodies. But, according to cognitive psychologist and public intellectual Steven Pinker, this view is mistaken. In The Blank Slate, Steven Pinker argues that contemporary science shows instead that humans have an innate tendency toward conflict, personalities shaped by their genes, and entirely physical minds.

As the Johnstone Family Professor of Psychology at Harvard University, Pinker brings contemporary academic research into his arguments throughout The Blank Slate. Further, as the author of bestsellers like The Better Angels of Our Nature and Rationality, Pinker is known for distilling dense academic research into accessible prose.

We’ll start by outlining the three components of the mainstream view of human nature—empiricism, romanticism, and dualism—that Pinker critiques. Next, we’ll examine the alleged benefits of those views and Pinker’s responses to those claims. Afterward, we’ll discuss Pinker’s scientific arguments against the three components of the mainstream view, and we’ll look at three alternative components of Pinker’s scientific conception of human nature: our accurate mental abilities, error-prone conscience, and tendency to engage in conflict. Finally, we’ll discuss what Pinker’s scientific view means for gender differences, politics, and how we understand children.

The Mainstream View of Human Nature

We’ll start by outlining the mainstream view of human nature that Pinker criticizes. According to Pinker, this view is composed of three key ideas: 

  • Empiricism, which says that humans have no innate traits or knowledge
  • Romanticism, which says that humans are innately good
  • Dualism, which says that the mind is immaterial

Empiricism

The core of the prevailing view of human nature is empiricism. Pinker explains that, according to this doctrine, humans are a “blank slate” whose psychology and behavior are shaped only by their environment. 

This view—famously trumpeted by 17th-century English philosopher John Locke—holds that any differences between two people are a byproduct of different environments, rather than any traits they’re born with. For example, you might think that some children are naturally agreeable and others are naturally disagreeable, but empiricism claims otherwise: Some children become disagreeable through their environments, while others become agreeable through different environments. For example, children raised by gentle, even-tempered parents might become friendly, while those raised by rude, emotionally volatile parents might become asocial.

According to Pinker, the upshot of empiricism is that any undesirable social conditions—for example, high crime rates, poverty, and illegal substance use—stem from shortcomings in our environment. For instance, high crime rates are considered a byproduct of a flawed society or upbringing, and gender disparities in different careers are blamed on the ways that society treats men and women differently. 

Romanticism

Although empiricism is the cornerstone of the mainstream intellectual view of human nature, Pinker contends that it’s typically accompanied by romanticism. According to romanticism, humans are innately benevolent and altruistic, while our environments are responsible for our unsavory traits, like greed and aggressiveness. 

This view, which is most commonly associated with 18th-century French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau, suggests that individuals who develop free from corruptive societal pressures will remain perfectly good. Pinker reports that, for this reason, romanticism generally opposes authoritarian approaches to government and raising children, since both can corrupt otherwise good-natured people. 

Dualism

The third aspect of the mainstream view of human nature is dualism. Pinker relates that dualism is the view that the body is entirely physical while the mind is entirely non-physical

Popularized by 17th-century French philosopher René Descartes, dualism implies that the mind can’t be understood using the mechanistic laws of physics, since those laws only apply to physical objects. On the contrary, dualists believe that the mind is an eternal soul that outlives the body and isn’t bound by the laws of nature.

The Alleged Benefits of the Mainstream View

Having explored what the three components of the mainstream view of human nature are, we’ll now examine why this view became mainstream by assessing three of its primary benefits. Academics claim that empiricism provides a strong argument against discrimination, dualism makes a compelling case against determinism, and romanticism makes individual and social progress possible. 

Benefit #1: Empiricism Prevents Discrimination and Oppression

Pinker contends that the mainstream view’s first benefit concerns social justice. According to its proponents, this view of human nature acts as a bulwark against discrimination and oppression because it makes discrimination unfounded. 

According to Pinker, proponents’ reasoning behind this view is straightforward: Because empiricism is true, all humans are identical and only differ due to their environments. So, no discrimination is justifiable since we’re all essentially identical. For example, because members of all races are identical at their core, racial discrimination is irrational. 

By contrast, if empiricism were false, social scientists worry that discrimination and oppression would be legitimized. For instance, if one racial group scored higher than another on an intelligence test, that would appear to be grounds for discrimination against the group with lower scores. These differences could provide grounds for tolerating oppressive practices because group differences in society could be blamed on inherent differences. For example, wealthy people might not sympathize with the poor, claiming they have inherently less work ethic or competence. 

Pinker’s Response

However, Pinker argues that this benefit is moot because discrimination is unjustifiable regardless of whether there are innate differences between people. He explains that discrimination would be unfounded because of the basic moral truth that it’s wrong to judge individuals on the basis of average traits of groups. For example, even if members of one gender committed crimes at a higher-than-average rate, it’d still be prejudiced to make negative judgments about individual members of that gender, since that would amount to condemning people for a trait that they can’t control—in this case, their gender.

Benefit #2: Romanticism Enables Progress

Advocates of the mainstream view of human nature discuss the benefits of romanticism. According to Pinker, many intellectuals embrace romanticism because it makes individual and social progress possible. 

Let’s explore these proponents’ reasoning. To understand the connection between romanticism and progress, imagine that romanticism were false, meaning humans weren’t naturally benevolent and altruistic. If humans instead had a natural predisposition toward (say) greed, violence, and dishonesty, it would appear futile to work toward progress. After all, if society is full of inherently immoral people, any hope of creating a just society seems ill-founded. Likewise, any hope of individual moral progress seems bound to fail. 

Pinker’s Response

However, Pinker argues that this line of reasoning stems from a shoddy inference. Contrary to the above argument, Pinker writes that humans don’t have to be incapable of altruism even if they aren’t naturally altruistic. It’s far more reasonable to think that humans are complex beings whose naturally problematic desires are tempered by abilities like self-restraint and reason. Consequently, progress is possible even if romanticism is false since humans can learn to conquer their desires. 

Benefit #3: Dualism Explains Free Will

Advocates of the mainstream view also argue that it explains an essential part of human nature: free will. Pinker relates that, according to these advocates, dualism recognizes that we have free will because dualism entails that our actions aren’t bound by deterministic laws of nature.

According to many dualists, if dualism were false, then our minds would be physical objects (likely our brains) governed by the laws of nature. Then, Pinker clarifies, we’d seem to lose the defining feature of free will—the ability to choose otherwise. For example, if a criminal’s decision to rob a bank was predetermined by the laws of nature, it seems that they had to rob the bank, meaning they didn’t act freely. However, if that criminal’s mind were non-physical, their decision to rob the bank wouldn’t have been constrained by the laws of nature, meaning they could’ve acted freely.

Pinker’s Response

Pinker, however, argues that this opposition to determinism hinges on a fallacy—the inference that fully explaining the causes of behavior amounts to showing the behavior wasn’t free. In the case of the bank robber, for example, someone might infer that because the robber’s actions were caused by forces outside their control (such as their genes and environment), their decision to rob the bank wasn’t free. 

But Pinker argues that this inference isn’t valid because the alternative is that only unexplained actions can be free. Unexplained actions, however, are byproducts of random chance, and it’s clear that random actions aren’t free—for instance, if all our decisions were the result of a random coin flip, that wouldn’t qualify as free will. Thus, Pinker concludes that free will must be compatible with determinism’s comprehensive explanations of our behavior. 

The Scientific Arguments Against the Mainstream View of Human Nature

According to Pinker, the mainstream view of human nature doesn’t just fail to deliver the benefits it promises—it also fails to reflect findings from contemporary science. He argues that findings from behavioral genetics, evolutionary psychology, and cognitive science undermine empiricism, romanticism, and dualism, respectively. 

Argument #1: Behavioral Genetics Undermines Empiricism

First, Pinker relates that behavioral genetics refutes the empiricist notion that our personality depends on our environment alone because it shows that our genes predispose us toward certain ways of thinking and acting. For example, Pinker points out that twin studies—ones that examine identical twins raised in separate households—reveal that identical twins are significantly more likely to share the same cognitive disorders (such as autism, depression, and anxiety) than adopted siblings raised in the same household. In other words, people who share the same genetic material are significantly more similar than those who share the same environment.

Argument #2: Evolutionary Psychology Undermines Romanticism

Second, Pinker points out that evolutionary psychology is at odds with romanticism since evolution has steered the brain toward selfishness rather than romantic altruism. 

He clarifies that, according to evolutionary psychology, the brain’s tendencies are byproducts of natural selection—the process by which genes that are most likely to be passed down to future generations are selected for and become more frequent. For example, because intelligent people are more likely to survive and therefore reproduce, genes for intelligence are selected for and—as intelligent people reproduce—become more frequent in the population. 

Consequently, genes that encourage selfishness are likely to prevail over altruistic genes, because acting selfishly maximizes our chances of reproducing and passing down our genes. For instance, if our brains were predisposed to horde food, that would increase our chance of surviving long enough to reproduce. 

Argument #3: Cognitive Science Undermines Dualism

Finally, Pinker argues that cognitive science undermines dualism because it has shown that the mind can be a purely physical entity. Specifically, he contends that the computational theory of mind (CTM) provides a framework for understanding how the mind could arise in a physical world. 

According to the CTM, the mind is analogous to a computer. Mental processes—such as reasoning, learning, and remembering—are computer processes that take inputs from the physical world and yield the correct output. For example, your eyes provide the input from processing a cherry blossom tree with pink flowers, leading to the output, which might be your belief that cherry blossoms are in bloom. 

Crucially, Pinker points out that the CTM doesn’t require that any part of the mind be non-physical. After all, the inputs are first processed by physical body parts (like your eyes, ears, and skin). Then, the outputs are processed by physical structures in the brain.

The Alternative Scientific View of Human Nature

Now that we’ve seen why Pinker rejects the mainstream view of human nature, we’ll consider three components of Pinker’s alternative conception of human nature—our accurate cognitive faculties, fallible consciences, and predisposition toward conflict.

Component #1: Accurate Mental Representations

Having argued that the mainstream view of human nature is false, Pinker seeks to replace it by showing that science establishes an alternative conception of human nature. In this section, we’ll look at the first component of the scientific view of human nature: accurate mental representations. Pinker argues that our brains have evolved to use categories, languages, and images to accurately represent the world

Mental Representation #1: Categories

Pinker points out that our brains accurately sort things into different categories that help us reason about the world. For instance, your brain might categorize “large green things with scales and sharp teeth that swim underwater” as alligators, allowing you to identify alligators when you see them. Then, because you know that alligators are dangerous, this categorization allows you to respond appropriately when you see an alligator—whether that means running away or choosing not to engage.

Mental Representation #2: Language

In addition, Pinker writes that our brains have the capacity for language that allows us to accurately represent the world. Unlike postmodernists, who allege that language is merely a consistent system with no connection to the actual world, Pinker argues that we intuitively grasp the connection between our words and our world. For example, we often lament situations in which we can’t find the words to describe our experiences, but this presupposes that we can use language to accurately represent our experiences.

Mental Representation #3: Images

Finally, Pinker argues that we use images to faithfully capture the world. These images can be physical, like photographs, or mental representations, like when you imagine an apple. Once again, he notes that according to postmodernists, images have no connection to the external world; postmodernist theory holds that images are equivalent to reality, rather than representative of reality. But Pinker notes that this thesis contradicts our practice of critiquing images as unrealistic—for example, we might critique a painting of a celebrity if it doesn’t resemble them. Contrary to the postmodernist view, this practice presupposes that images can accurately resemble the world.

Component #2: Fallible Moral Judgments

While these mental representations help us understand the physical world, Pinker argues that another aspect of human nature helps us understand the world of morality—our conscience. According to Pinker, the human conscience evolved as a fallible way of grounding our moral judgments.

Pinker writes that, just like the rest of the human mind, our conscience evolved as a combination of neural circuits designed to help us reproduce. For this reason, we often deem actions immoral if they harm our ability to pass down our genetic material. For example, we would be outraged if a member of our family or community were murdered, and it’s clear that murdering someone who shares our genes would make it harder to pass down those genes. 

However, Pinker argues that because our conscience has an evolutionary origin, we’re prone to mistakes when actions that aren’t actually immoral harm our ability to pass down our genes. For instance, he notes that most people have a moral aversion to incest between siblings—an action that can lead to genetic defects if siblings reproduce. But, according to Pinker, many ethicists believe that incest can be permissible under the correct conditions (for example, if both adults are consenting and using contraception). 

Component #3: Predisposition Toward Conflict

In addition to describing our tendency to make fallible moral judgments, Pinker argues that we’re predisposed toward conflict because nobody shares our exact genetic interests.

To start, Pinker reminds us that according to evolutionary theory, natural selection has made it more likely we’ll pass down genes that enhance our genetic fitness (that is, make us more likely to reproduce). For this reason, genes that lead us to act in our own self-interest are passed down, as these genes make it more likely that we’ll reproduce. 

The upshot is that we’re predisposed toward conflict because acting in our own self-interest often requires us to act against the best interests of others. For instance, siblings within families are likely to vie for parental attention because this attention is beneficial for their development but is a finite resource.

The Implications of the Scientific View of Human Nature

Having established some of the components of Pinker’s scientific conception of human nature, we’ll now turn to its implications. In particular, we’ll examine arguments that some differences in male and female minds are rooted in genetics, political conservatism is better-founded than progressivism, and children’s personalities are largely heritable.

Implication #1: Genes Shape Some Cognitive Differences Between Males and Females 

According to Pinker, the scientific view of human nature sheds light on the hot-button issue of gender. In particular, he argues that this account of human nature shows that some differences in men’s and women’s minds have roots in genetics, in contrast with the empiricist idea that gender differences are caused by socialization alone.

Pinker cites scientific studies refuting the empiricist idea that socialization alone causes gender differences. For example, one study examined 25 genetically male children born without a penis due to a medical condition. They were castrated and brought up as girls. The study found that all of these children exhibited traditionally male characteristics (like roughhousing) and half of them declared themselves boys without knowing of their condition. According to Pinker, if gender differences were caused only by culture, this outcome would be unexpected. 

In practice, Pinker suggests that the gender gap—that many careers have a disproportionately low percentage of women—could have a partially genetic explanation. For example, he notes that the higher percentage of male mathematicians and engineers could be partially due to the fact that, across different cultures, boys tend to have slightly better mathematical and spatial reasoning skills than girls from a young age. 

Pinker clarifies that such genetically rooted cognitive differences between men and women aren’t evidence of one gender’s superiority. Relatedly, any such differences aren’t grounds for gender discrimination. This takeaway aligns with his argument against empiricism: that discrimination is unjustifiable regardless of whether innate differences exist between people. 

Applying this takeaway to the world of work, Pinker argues for equality of opportunity in employment—ensuring men and women have access to the same career opportunities—over equality of outcomes, or the idea of basing employment decisions on the goal of proportional representation. Given this, he says, we should focus on supporting policies that make it easier for men and women to thrive in the careers they choose—regardless of whether they choose those careers in equal numbers.

Implication #2: Political Conservatism Is Well-Founded

Pinker also contends that his account of human nature helps us assess the foundations of conservative and progressive political thought. He argues that his account of human nature shows that conservatism rests on a stronger foundation than progressivism, as conservatives have traditionally assumed that humans are inherently selfish and corruptible.

For context, Pinker explains that secular conservatives such as Edmund Burke have traditionally accepted the view that humans lack understanding and morality. Consequently, they prefer preserving current social traditions because they believe it’s difficult to find new social structures that can accommodate humans’ inherent selfishness and ignorance. For example, consider the tradition of the US’s electoral college, which elects the President via state delegates whose numbers aren’t perfectly proportional to state populations. Even if this was a suboptimal system, Burke might encourage retaining it because any replacement could be worse.

Pinker points out that, by contrast, progressives like Rousseau have historically accepted that humans are malleable and any limits to our knowledge and morality come from flawed social structures. For this reason, progressives are quick to upend existing social conditions that they think are less than ideal. 

According to Pinker, it’s clear that the view of human nature that traditional conservatives accept is more accurate—for example, science has shown that humans are prone to conflict and have inherently fallible consciences, just as the conservative view assumes. The progressive view, on the other hand, accepts doctrines similar to empiricism and romanticism, which Pinker already argued are misguided. 

Implication #3: Children’s Personalities Are Heritable

Finally, Pinker examines what his scientific account of human nature says about children. Although empiricists contend that children’s personalities depend heavily on their upbringing and home life, Pinker instead argues that children’s personality traits are heritable and their upbringing plays little role

Pinker maintains that twin studies show that all personality traits are heritable to at least some extent. He explains that, because these twins aren’t raised in the same environment, any degree of similarity between them can only have genetic origins. When tested for various core traits (like intelligence, neuroticism, and agreeableness) these twins consistently show heritability values of around 0.5, meaning that 50% of the variation in each personality trait has a genetic origin. 

Pinker points out that, by contrast, similar studies have shown that our family upbringing has almost negligible impact on our personality. For example, studies of adult siblings’ personality traits reveal that these siblings are similar regardless of whether they grew up in the same household. Adopted siblings, on the other hand, don’t demonstrate a higher average degree of similarity than two random strangers.

The Blank Slate by Steven Pinker: Book Overview & Takeaways

Elizabeth Whitworth

Elizabeth has a lifelong love of books. She devours nonfiction, especially in the areas of history, theology, and philosophy. A switch to audiobooks has kindled her enjoyment of well-narrated fiction, particularly Victorian and early 20th-century works. She appreciates idea-driven books—and a classic murder mystery now and then. Elizabeth has a blog and is writing a book about the beginning and the end of suffering.

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