Are you tired of the constant political division in America? Is it possible to reduce polarization through institutional changes?
In his book Why We’re Polarized, Ezra Klein proposes a set of institutional reforms aimed at reducing political polarization in the United States. He suggests three key changes: replacing the Electoral College, creating multi-member districts, and eliminating the Senate filibuster.
Keep reading to get details on Klein’s proposals and to understand how these institutional reforms could reshape American democracy.
Proposed Institutional Reforms
In Why We’re Polarized, Ezra Klein recommends a set of reforms to American political institutions that reduce politicians’ incentives to stoke division. Klein argues that these changes would put democracy on a sounder footing. Klein proposes three institutional reforms:
- Replacing the Electoral College with a direct popular vote for the presidency
- Creating multi-member districts
- Changing the rules of the US Senate to eliminate the filibuster
1) Direct Elections for the Presidency
The first institutional reform Klein proposes is to replace the Electoral College with a direct popular election for the presidency.
According to Klein, the mechanics of the Electoral College create a built-in advantage for low-population, rural, and predominantly white states over high-population, urban, and ethnically diverse states. This effectively boosts Republicans while disadvantaging Democrats. And, Klein writes, in two of the most recent presidential elections, the anti-democratic flaws of the Electoral College have resulted in the Republican loser of the popular vote winning the presidency—George W. Bush in 2000 and Donald Trump in 2016.
Klein argues that replacing this system with a direct popular election for the presidency would be more democratically legitimate and force Republicans to compete on a more level playing field. If the party was forced to appeal to a majority of all voters instead of just its partisan base, Republicans would have far less incentive to engage in a polarizing style of politics. Instead, they would be compelled to reach out to and win over more middle-of-the-road voters and voters who don’t already share their ideology.
2) Multi-Member Districts
The second institutional reform Klein proposes is creating multi-member districts, in which more than one candidate can win a seat. This would be a significant departure from the US’s current system of winner-take-all single-member districts.
Under the current system, each district only has one representative. And because there’s only one seat to be won, voters have a strong incentive to gravitate toward one of the two major parties—instead of voting for a third-party candidate, which would split the vote and allow the rival party to win.
To illustrate this, imagine an election where there’s a right-wing Party A, a center-left Party B, and a further left Party C. If Party A receives 10,000 votes, Party B receives 9,999 votes, and Party C receives 8,000 votes, Party A wins the seat—Party B and Party C get nothing for winning a combined majority of the votes (64% or 17,999 out of 27,999 votes cast). Because the two left-wing parties split their votes, the right-wing party wins with a minority of the total vote (36% or 10,000 out of 27,999 votes cast).
Klein writes that this dynamic effectively rewards and reinforces the major parties’ tactics of unending partisan rhetoric and polarization: They know that their voters won’t abandon them or vote third party for fear of throwing the election to the rival party.
Multi-member districts would reduce the incentive for partisanship and polarization, observes Klein. If, for example, each district had five members—that is, the top five vote-getters earn a seat—voters would have more freedom to vote for the candidate they liked the best, since they wouldn’t have to worry about splitting the vote and inadvertently electing their least-preferred candidate.
3) Simple Majority Votes in the Senate
The third institutional reform Klein proposes is abolishing the legislative filibuster in the Senate and replacing it with a simple majority vote. The filibuster is a rule in the Senate that requires a bill to get a 60-vote supermajority (a 60% threshold in the 100-member chamber) to end debate on it. It can then go to a final floor vote, where it will then receive a simple majority up-or-down vote. Unless the majority party wins 60% of the Senate seats, the filibuster gives the minority party the means, motive, and opportunity to veto the majority’s agenda.
Klein writes that the filibuster breeds cynicism among the voters because it makes it impossible for the majority party to govern and implement the agenda it was elected to implement. Voters then become convinced that the majority party is corrupt, dishonest, or incompetent. They typically respond by punishing that party at the polls and electing the minority party to replace them—effectively rewarding the minority party for its obstructionism.
Without a filibuster, argues Klein, legislative majorities would have a greater ability to pass legislation and enact their agenda. This would tamp down the voter cynicism and disillusionment that helps foster polarization. Instead, voters would see a greater connection between their votes and actual policies enacted. If voters are pleased with the policies passed by the majority party, they can reward that party at the next election; if they’re displeased, they can vote them out. Klein argues that this is precisely how politics is supposed to work in a healthy, functioning democracy.
