What’s wrong with the mainstream view of human nature? How does it hold up in light of current scientific understanding?
In The Blank Slate, Steven Pinker lays out his scientific arguments against the mainstream view of human nature. Then, he articulates a scientific view of human nature and what this alternative perspective means for gender differences, politics, and our understanding of personality.
Read more to understand where Pinker is coming from.
Scientific Arguments Against the Mainstream View of Human Nature
According to Pinker, the mainstream view of human nature doesn’t just fail to deliver the benefits it promises—it also fails to reflect findings from contemporary science. He argues that findings from behavioral genetics, evolutionary psychology, and cognitive science undermine empiricism, romanticism, and dualism, respectively.
Argument #1: Behavioral Genetics Undermines Empiricism
First, Pinker relates that behavioral genetics refutes the empiricist notion that our personality depends on our environment alone because it shows that our genes predispose us toward certain ways of thinking and acting. For example, Pinker points out that twin studies—ones that examine identical twins raised in separate households—reveal that identical twins are significantly more likely to share the same cognitive disorders (such as autism, depression, and anxiety) than adopted siblings raised in the same household. In other words, people who share the same genetic material are significantly more similar than those who share the same environment.
Argument #2: Evolutionary Psychology Undermines Romanticism
Second, Pinker points out that evolutionary psychology is at odds with romanticism since evolution has steered the brain toward selfishness rather than romantic altruism.
He clarifies that, according to evolutionary psychology, the brain’s tendencies are byproducts of natural selection—the process by which genes that are most likely to be passed down to future generations are selected for and become more frequent. For example, because intelligent people are more likely to survive and therefore reproduce, genes for intelligence are selected for and—as intelligent people reproduce—become more frequent in the population.
Consequently, genes that encourage selfishness are likely to prevail over altruistic genes, because acting selfishly maximizes our chances of reproducing and passing down our genes. For instance, if our brains were predisposed to horde food, that would increase our chance of surviving long enough to reproduce.
Argument #3: Cognitive Science Undermines Dualism
Finally, Pinker argues that cognitive science undermines dualism because it has shown that the mind can be a purely physical entity. Specifically, he contends that the computational theory of mind (CTM) provides a framework for understanding how the mind could arise in a physical world.
According to the CTM, the mind is analogous to a computer. Mental processes—such as reasoning, learning, and remembering—are computer processes that take inputs from the physical world and yield the correct output. For example, your eyes provide the input from processing a cherry blossom tree with pink flowers, leading to the output, which might be your belief that cherry blossoms are in bloom.
Crucially, Pinker points out that the CTM doesn’t require that any part of the mind be non-physical. After all, the inputs are first processed by physical body parts (like your eyes, ears, and skin). Then, the outputs are processed by physical structures in the brain.
The Scientific View of Human Nature
Now that we’ve seen why Pinker rejects the mainstream view of human nature, we’ll consider three components of Pinker’s alternative conception of human nature—our accurate cognitive faculties, fallible consciences, and predisposition toward conflict.
Component #1: Accurate Mental Representations
Having argued that the mainstream view of human nature is false, Pinker seeks to replace it by showing that science establishes an alternative conception of human nature. In this section, we’ll look at the first component of the scientific view of human nature: accurate mental representations. Pinker argues that our brains have evolved to use categories, languages, and images to accurately represent the world.
Mental Representation #1: Categories
Pinker points out that our brains accurately sort things into different categories that help us reason about the world. For instance, your brain might categorize “large green things with scales and sharp teeth that swim underwater” as alligators, allowing you to identify alligators when you see them. Then, because you know that alligators are dangerous, this categorization allows you to respond appropriately when you see an alligator—whether that means running away or choosing not to engage.
Mental Representation #2: Language
In addition, Pinker writes that our brains have the capacity for language that allows us to accurately represent the world. Unlike postmodernists, who allege that language is merely a consistent system with no connection to the actual world, Pinker argues that we intuitively grasp the connection between our words and our world. For example, we often lament situations in which we can’t find the words to describe our experiences, but this presupposes that we can use language to accurately represent our experiences.
Mental Representation #3: Images
Finally, Pinker argues that we use images to faithfully capture the world. These images can be physical, like photographs, or mental representations, like when you imagine an apple. Once again, he notes that according to postmodernists, images have no connection to the external world; postmodernist theory holds that images are equivalent to reality, rather than representative of reality. But Pinker notes that this thesis contradicts our practice of critiquing images as unrealistic—for example, we might critique a painting of a celebrity if it doesn’t resemble them. Contrary to the postmodernist view, this practice presupposes that images can accurately resemble the world.
Component #2: Fallible Moral Judgments
While these mental representations help us understand the physical world, Pinker argues that another aspect of human nature helps us understand the world of morality—our conscience. According to Pinker, the human conscience evolved as a fallible way of grounding our moral judgments.
Pinker writes that, just like the rest of the human mind, our conscience evolved as a combination of neural circuits designed to help us reproduce. For this reason, we often deem actions immoral if they harm our ability to pass down our genetic material. For example, we would be outraged if a member of our family or community were murdered, and it’s clear that murdering someone who shares our genes would make it harder to pass down those genes.
However, Pinker argues that because our conscience has an evolutionary origin, we’re prone to mistakes when actions that aren’t actually immoral harm our ability to pass down our genes. For instance, he notes that most people have a moral aversion to incest between siblings—an action that can lead to genetic defects if siblings reproduce. But, according to Pinker, many ethicists believe that incest can be permissible under the correct conditions (for example, if both adults are consenting and using contraception).
| Evolutionary Arguments Against Moral Realism While Pinker argues that the evolutionary origin of our conscience means that some of our moral judgments are suspect, other moral philosophers go a step further, arguing that all of our moral judgments are faulty. According to their evolutionary debunking arguments, our capacity for moral reasoning evolved to enhance our genetic fitness—our ability to pass our genes down to future generations. However, they warn that we have no reason to think that the moral judgments that enhance genetic fitness are also true. For instance, according to this logic, we don’t have any reason to think that it’s true that killing innocent people is immoral. Similarly, there’s no reason to believe it’s true that incest between siblings is immoral. The upshot is that morality’s alleged evolutionary origin should lead to universal moral skepticism. These philosophers contend that, rather than viewing our moral intuitions as reliable guides to truth, we should instead view them as useful tools for passing down our genes. |
Component #3: Predisposition Toward Conflict
In addition to describing our tendency to make fallible moral judgments, Pinker argues that we’re predisposed toward conflict because nobody shares our exact genetic interests.
To start, Pinker reminds us that according to evolutionary theory, natural selection has made it more likely we’ll pass down genes that enhance our genetic fitness (that is, make us more likely to reproduce). For this reason, genes that lead us to act in our own self-interest are passed down, as these genes make it more likely that we’ll reproduce.
(Shortform note: Although Pinker is correct that natural selection often favors genes that make us act in our own self-interest, experts point out that maladaptive traits—those that are actively harmful to our reproductive fitness—can also arise through evolution. For example, while a peacock’s colorful tail originally arose to impress potential mates, it can also make peacocks more salient to predators, hurting their survival chances.)
The upshot is that we’re predisposed toward conflict because acting in our own self-interest often requires us to act against the best interests of others. For instance, siblings within families are likely to vie for parental attention because this attention is beneficial for their development but is a finite resource.
(Shortform note: In other words, to borrow from game theoretic language, our self-interest is often a zero-sum game—a game in which one party’s gain necessarily equals the other party’s loss.)
The Implications of the Scientific View of Human Nature
Having established some of the components of Pinker’s scientific conception of human nature, we’ll now turn to its implications. In particular, we’ll examine arguments that some differences in male and female minds are rooted in genetics, political conservatism is better-founded than progressivism, and children’s personalities are largely heritable.
Implication #1: Genes Shape Some Cognitive Differences Between Males and Females
According to Pinker, the scientific view of human nature sheds light on the hot-button issue of gender. In particular, he argues that this account of human nature shows that some differences in men’s and women’s minds have roots in genetics, in contrast with the empiricist idea that gender differences are caused by socialization alone.
Pinker cites scientific studies refuting the empiricist idea that socialization alone causes gender differences. For example, one study examined 25 genetically male children born without a penis due to a medical condition. They were castrated and brought up as girls. The study found that all of these children exhibited traditionally male characteristics (like roughhousing) and half of them declared themselves boys without knowing of their condition. According to Pinker, if gender differences were caused only by culture, this outcome would be unexpected.
In practice, Pinker suggests that the gender gap—that many careers have a disproportionately low percentage of women—could have a partially genetic explanation. For example, he notes that the higher percentage of male mathematicians and engineers could be partially due to the fact that, across different cultures, boys tend to have slightly better mathematical and spatial reasoning skills than girls from a young age.
Pinker clarifies that such genetically rooted cognitive differences between men and women aren’t evidence of one gender’s superiority. Relatedly, any such differences aren’t grounds for gender discrimination. This takeaway aligns with his argument against empiricism: that discrimination is unjustifiable regardless of whether innate differences exist between people.
Applying this takeaway to the world of work, Pinker argues for equality of opportunity in employment—ensuring men and women have access to the same career opportunities—over equality of outcomes, or the idea of basing employment decisions on the goal of proportional representation. Given this, he says, we should focus on supporting policies that make it easier for men and women to thrive in the careers they choose—regardless of whether they choose those careers in equal numbers.
Implication #2: Political Conservatism Is Well-Founded
Pinker also contends that his account of human nature helps us assess the foundations of conservative and progressive political thought. He argues that his account of human nature shows that conservatism rests on a stronger foundation than progressivism, as conservatives have traditionally assumed that humans are inherently selfish and corruptible.
For context, Pinker explains that secular conservatives such as Edmund Burke have traditionally accepted the view that humans lack understanding and morality. Consequently, they prefer preserving current social traditions because they believe it’s difficult to find new social structures that can accommodate humans’ inherent selfishness and ignorance. For example, consider the tradition of the US’s electoral college, which elects the President via state delegates whose numbers aren’t perfectly proportional to state populations. Even if this was a suboptimal system, Burke might encourage retaining it because any replacement could be worse.
Pinker points out that, by contrast, progressives like Rousseau have historically accepted that humans are malleable and any limits to our knowledge and morality come from flawed social structures. For this reason, progressives are quick to upend existing social conditions that they think are less than ideal.
According to Pinker, it’s clear that the view of human nature that traditional conservatives accept is more accurate—for example, science has shown that humans are prone to conflict and have inherently fallible consciences, just as the conservative view assumes. The progressive view, on the other hand, accepts doctrines similar to empiricism and romanticism, which Pinker already argued are misguided.
Implication #3: Children’s Personalities Are Heritable
Finally, Pinker examines what his scientific account of human nature says about children. Although empiricists contend that children’s personalities depend heavily on their upbringing and home life, Pinker instead argues that children’s personality traits are heritable and their upbringing plays little role.
Pinker maintains that twin studies show that all personality traits are heritable to at least some extent. He explains that, because these twins aren’t raised in the same environment, any degree of similarity between them can only have genetic origins. When tested for various core traits (like intelligence, neuroticism, and agreeableness) these twins consistently show heritability values of around 0.5, meaning that 50% of the variation in each personality trait has a genetic origin.
Pinker points out that, by contrast, similar studies have shown that our family upbringing has almost negligible impact on our personality. For example, studies of adult siblings’ personality traits reveal that these siblings are similar regardless of whether they grew up in the same household. Adopted siblings, on the other hand, don’t demonstrate a higher average degree of similarity than two random strangers.
